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Tliis thesis considers the security management issue of electronic data interchange
(EDI) and the security tools that are used for secure EDI implementation. Management
considerations of EDI are considered to be an integration of EDI and security services. The
background of EDI is surveyed along with EDI implementation procedures and Digital
Signature (DS) techniques. The security services that are being used today are discussed in
Chapter 5 including the EDI-related security standards. Finally, a security management
model is presented that may be used to improve the security of an EDI implementation. The
model is based on the perceived threats and vulnerabilities to the EDI, and the availability
of security services and mechanisms. Included in the model are the setting of security goals,
the determination of security policies, the determination of priorities for EDI security, and
the construction of security architecture and management activities.
This thesis was written to survey the concepts of EDI and DS. The survey of EDI-
related security standards may provide an opportunity to understand security services and
security mechanisms available when designing an EDI system. Also, the security
management model may help to improve the security of an organization.
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The increasing use of electronic transmission and storage of documents has given rise
to new requirements for document security and authentication. In particular, it is necessary
to consider schemes that provide at least similar authenticity to that provided by traditional
paper documents and written signatures.
B. PURPOSE
This thesis describes methods that may be used to improve the security of electronic
data interchange (EDI). Additionally, it discusses issues of applying digital signature (DS)
as security tools on EDI. These methods are based on perceived threats and vulnerabilities
that could occur when using EDI. The thesis also presents the proper security management
of organizations and their trading partners. The contribution of this thesis, first of all, is to
formalize the concept of EDI and DS. Secondly, it surveys threats and vulnerabilities that
can occur in the implementation of EDI. Thirdly, it surveys EDI-related security standards
that impact security services and security mechanisms for EDI. Finally, a security
management model is built that can be used to improve the security of an implementation
of EDI. This process is based on perceived threats and vulnerabilities and considerations of
security services and mechanisms. This process includes the setting of security goals, the
determination of security policy, the determination of priorities for EDI security, the
construction of security architecture, and management activities. The integration of EDI
and security services is the principle management consideration of EDI.
C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION
EDI and DS systems are first surveyed in Chapters II and III. The survey focuses on
what information system (IS) managers need to know if they want to implement EDI and
secure their business information. Having introduced the state-of-the-art of EDI and DS,
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we discuss in Chapter IV the security problems that EDI users will face. The vulnerabilities
and threats which emerge from the nature of EDI components (e.g., software, hardware,
platform, and management skill) and the required security services and security
mechanisms that can be utiUzed to prevent those security problems are also mentioned in
Chapter IV.
How to apply security standards and their security structures that have been
recommended by several international organizations is presented in Chapter V. The
security services proposed by those standards are widely used by EDI vendors when
implementing EDI. Finally, we build a security management model. This model will
consider the security goals of organizations, the security policy and several managerial
considerations of EDI implementations that will improve the security of an organization.
Chapter VI concludes the thesis with suggestions.
n. ELEMENTS OF ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE
A. INTRODUCTION
The concept of EDI started over 30 years ago. During the 196()s, the Transportation
Data Coordinating Committee (TDCC) of U.S. became concerned about the strangling
effect of paperwork in the transponation industry. In 1975, the TDCC published the first
set of rules for EDI. many of which still apply. At that time, computer hardware, software
and networks were not capable of supporting these new business procedures. In 1979, the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) approved TDCC's approach to EDI access
and use, as embodied in the ANSI X12 standard. Since then, the ANSI X12 Committee has
generated over 20 cross-industry transaction data format variations of the basic theme to
accommodate unique situations in diverse businesses.
B. DEFINFTION OF EDI
EDI is the intercompany, computer-to-computer exchange of business documents in
standard electronic data formats. Transaction data is transmitted from the sender
company's application to the receiver company's application without human intervention.
Transactions (also called transaction sets) include invoices, shipping schedules, advance
ship notices, court filing, bills of lading, and purchase orders. These are transformed to a
standard data format and electronically transferred between trading partners without
utilizing hard copies and re-keying information. Standard transaction sets are approved by
ANSI in the X. 12 standard.
Although EDI and E-mail are similar, significant differences exist. The difference
between EDI and E-mail has been defined according to [Ref. 1] as follows:
- EDI - Electronic communications made up of predefined, fixed-format message-
length units.
- E-mail - Electronic communication made up of free-formatted message-length units.
C. TYPES OF EDI
Various systems implement different types of EDI. The specific implementation
depends on the roles of the participants and the operation process of EDI. Here, we discuss
two types of classification schemes of EDI.
1. Roles of Participants
One can classify the types of EDI by the roles of participants. These include:
a. One-to-Many System
The central point is a single company, sometimes, a large company (typically
called "hub") with many trading partners (usually called "spokes"). These participants are
usually the suppliers for the company, their dealers, or the customers. For example, a single
automobile manufacturer buys various parts from numerous suppliers and then sells cars to
their dealers and customers. This may be achieved by directly connecting the EDI systems
of the single manufacturer to many trading partners.
b. Valued Added Network (VAN) System
In the VAN system, the central point is less defined and the application
system takes on an electronic warehouse flavor, with many buyers and sellers interacting.
It is a logical extension of the one-to-many system. For example, several automobile
manufacturers are buying parts from the same suppliers and selling cars to the same dealers.
They can link through a third-party network and buy the communication services from it.
This third-party network may provide translation to different data formats, security
services, network maintenance, EDI implementation consulting and other value-added
services.
c. Incremental Paper Trail System
The incremental paper trail system is the extension of the VAN system. In the
incremental paper trail system, transaction documents are not created at a single point.
Instead, they pass through a chain of intermediaries, each of which adds to the information
and documents. For example. VAN systems can link with financial institutions and freight
forwarders to transfer funds electronically and add documentations for export.
2. Process of EDI
Another way to classify EDI systems is by process.
a. Batch Processing EDI
Groups of transactions from various participants are sent to a platform, which
places them into storage (like mailboxes). Trading partners then retrieve them at a later time
after the transactions are updated by batch processing. TTie average processing time is from
one hour to one day.
b. Real-time EDI
The communication link through the VAN or other platforms is maintained
until the transaction is complete. Usually, real-time EDI ranges from one to 10 minutes.
Examples of real-time applications are order processing, just-in-time inventory
management (JIT, an ordering strategy that helps organizations to keep down inventory by
careful scheduling and transportation), retail quick response (QR), transportation inquiries
and price quotation systems. [Ref. 2]
c. Event-driven EDI •
When a document is received by a company, the generation of another
document is triggered. For example, if a merchandise release document comes from an auto
manufacturer to its supplier, that system will automatically trigger an automatic ship notice.
Event-driven EDI is between real-time and batch processing EDI. Another name is fast
batch. [Ref. 3]
Real-time EDI seems to be the best choice, when using high volumes of small,
standardized transaction sets. Unfortunately, not every EDI system is capable of working
in real-time.
D. LEVEL OF EDI
There are three implementation levels of EDI: end-to-end communication, intra-
integration and interexploitation. [Ref. 4]
1. End-to-end communication (Level 1)
This is the foundation of EDI installation. It consists of a computing platform,
translation software and communication links. This is the least expensive approach and
accordingly, offers the fewest benefits. Transactions received at this level may be keyed
into another system or turned into paper to be delivered. No business process reengineering
is required in implementing this EDI.
This system is viewed by the organization more as a communication system than
an information system. Emphasis is on the trading partner-initiated aspects of the system.
Usually, this system is implemented to respond to a small number of trading partners and
a limited number of business applications. Most EDI implementations are of a Level 1 type.
Level 1 EDI generally applies to smaller spoke companies on simple networks.
One example is a single product shop that has specific product suppliers. EDI
software may be bought depending on what kind machines and type of network that already
exist, without considering the integration of the information systems. Also, the application
may be used to only the part of transactions needed by the EDI system for the suppliers. If
other suppliers do not have an EDI system, they may still remain on paper work.
2. Intraintegration (Level 2)
This represents a Level 1 system that interoperates and integrates with other
information systems like a database management system. Level 2 systems affect business
operations and have a high likelihood to change business practices. Business processing
reengineering is likely to have occurred at this level. Application integration and
interoperabiliity with other systems are the primary characteristics of this EDI level. This
is a moderately expensive solution, but has the potential for significant benefits. The Level
2 system heavily impacts intracompany activities. Usually a large number and perhaps
hundreds ot trading partners are involved. Level 2 systems have the potential to be mission-
critical. Level 2 approaches may extend JIT or QR across the business organizadon. These
implementadons are mosdy being performed by large-scale EDI hub organizations on
mainframe systems.
For example, a company may interconnect their EDI system with their database
management system so that they can store and forward special transaction sets without re-
keying (purchasing orders, invoices, etc.).
3. Interexploitation (Level 3)
This is a Level 2 system that is more thoroughly integrated with business practices
on both ends of the communication link. Level 3 systems are expensive and require careful
implementadon over time. Their benefits may be very significant. The trading partners are
providing informadon to each other that was formerly classified as internal information
only. This system level allows trading partners to plan ahead for materials, machine time,
capacity and people. Level 3 systems may be mission-cridcal systems. Because of
complexity, only a few trading operations have achieved Level 3. This group includes
several transportadon companies that have integrated systems with their customers' needs.
These systems require trust between partners.
An example of Level 3 could be a supermarket that shares its anticipated shelf
withdrawals and special promotions with manufacturers who will use the information for
their production planning schedules.
E. COMPONENTS OF EDI
According to the implementation needs of EDI users, we can divide EDI systems into:
1. EDI Software Packages >
There are many EDI related software packages. Among the functions provided by
these packages, the most important is translation.
a. Data Mapping System
Data mapping creates special data maps to interface one application with
other applications. This system also has the ability to move any portion of data from the
EDI transaction sets to the application records.
For example, a purchase order received electronically may be automatically
entered and stored into the database system format through a data mapping system. Another
example is an invoice developed from the accounts receivable software and transmitted to
the recipient without human intervention. On-line data mapping modules can simplify EDI
integration within applications.
b. Translation Software
Translation software programs validate and edit raw information from a data
file, add control parameters and delimiters, and prepare the information to be
communicated among trading partners using a trading partner file. Some translation
software possesses the ability to turn around data in incoming EDI messages into outbound
EDI transaction sets. Some have the ability to enter bar-code data. Retailers can carry
handhold scanners, portable point-of-sale (POS) terminals and long-range laser scanning,
allowing a bar code to be read from more than 15 feet away. These devices communicate
via radio frequency (RP) signals with host systems or with stationary terminals. All data
collected in this manner may be converted directly to EDI standard format without reentry.
Inquiries may also be made directly to the database. [Ref. 5]
2. Networks Over Which EDI Occurs
These services represent a platform for EDI supplied as follows:
a. Standard Provided Network
One can send EDI documents on a network provided by telephone carriers or
by national institutions. This platform is free of charge and includes normal telephone lines
and gateway systems, such as the INTERNET and the CCITT X.400-based system.
b. Third-party EDI ISetworks
A VAN is usually a privately owned packet-switch network whose serv ices
are sold to the public. Such a system provides conversion of information between EDI
systems with incompatible message formats, communication services, and protocols.
VANs act as translators between different computer systems used by the buyers and
suppliers. Normally, VANs are more costly than standard networks as VAN services
charge fees, network while standard networks are free following development. VANs often
offer the most practical, rapid and secure solution for communication network needs.
Decisions about the use of VANs depend on the characteristics of the organization and the
needs of the organizations involved, such as message conversions, protocol conversions,
store and forward services to provide processing independence and other database/
information services (i. e., catalogues, schedules, etc.).
c. The Interoperability ofNetwork.
As many trading partners will not be on the same EDI platform,
interoperabiliity between platforms and the management of security of transactions over
these multiple platforms is critical. Interoperability requires:
(1) The ability to exchange EDI data or cryptographic keys, both manually
and automatically. In an automated environment, any party that implements this service
will use both compatible options of the relevant standards and compatible communications
facilities. These are issues that the mailbag protocol and CCITT X.435 are designed to
solve.
(2) The ability to support standards. This capability will give VANs
competitive advantages as standards can reduce the barriers of entry to EDI and increase
the acceptance of newcomers.
(3) The ability to link E-mail, Fax and EDI communications. EDI carried by
E-mail has been designed. The standard which applies is the CCITT X.435, on the market
one and half years. The problem of "How to link Fax with EDI without human
intervention?" still exists. Future EDI systems are expected to become more friendly.
(4) The ability of integration. Integration capability allows for an enterprise-
wide approach to EDI with multi-vendor computing environments that run multiple
platforms for exchanging documents with trading partners.
(5) The ability of international communication. Since business is no longer
limited to single countries, the ability to translate different languages with EDI software via
international networks is a future trend of EDI implementation.
F. BENEFITS OF EDI
1. Increased Productivity
EDI mitigates repeated data entry and manual handling of transactions that occurs
in non-EDI environments, making organizations more productive. An estimated 25% of the
cost of processing business transactions is related to basic data entry and associated tasks,
according to the estimates by Cashin [Ref. 6].
2. Decreased Lead Time and Inventories
As electronic order requests are transmitted more quickly and accurately than
paper work, EDI's instantaneous communication makes inventory reduction safer. It also
reduces the lead time previously necessary for purchase transactions. This can be achieved
with the support of JIT systems and QR programs using real-time EDI systems for
transportation inquiries and price quotation systems.
3. Increased Data Accuracy
EDI communication is direct, instantaneous, and immediately verifiable. EDI
transaction processes may occur without human intervention. EDI transactions are working
through the standard data format and interchanging electronically and automatically. Those
reasons make the EDI data more accurate.
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4. Cost Saving
Cost saving is achieved by eliminating paper work and improving bill
reconciliation and telephone calls. Cost reduction is still a long-term issue, but vastly
improved business procedures over a broad range of activities is an important goaJ as well.
5. Reducing Time of Processing Invoices
Prior to EDI, all invoices were processed by humans. Sending/receiving and even
filling the format of invoices required significant staff. All this work may now be done with
EDI software. These procedures include storage of the history invoices, sending/receiving
documents automatically on EDI platforms, and translating various invoices of different
trading partners, etc.
6. Establishing an Integration Base
Establishing the base for further integration of materials and manufacturing
systems is another benefit of EDI. By improving communication with suppliers, EDI
enhances production scheduling accuracy. This means less downtime due to late shipments
from suppliers. Quality assurance information may be received electronically from
suppliers, enabling production schedules to electronically feed directly into production
control systems for shipments.
7. Improves Trading Partner Relations
According to most users, the most important benefit of EDI has been improved
trading partner relations. Because both parties must add benefits to allow the EDI system
to function, EDI encourages a tremendous degree of cooperation between trading partners.
When designing an EDI system to serve the information-exchange needs of both parties,
trading partners must share their experiences with each other.
8. As a Competitive Tool Among Industry Competitors
In the past, any company that implemented various proprietary EDI systems
gained tremendous benefits. They possessed a greater ability to compete with those
11
competitors who did not implement EDI. In the future, as more companies accept EDI,
security services and the difficulty of implementation of these services will become the
main competition issues.
G. STANDARDS IN EDI
The exchange of electronic documents between companies in standard data formats is
fundamental to the definition of EDI. Only by using strict EDI standards can computers
transfer and process information automatically. There are two standards that apply:
I. External Communication Standards
a. CCITT X.400 Message Handling System (MHS)
CCITT X.400 is a member of the Open System Interconnection (OSI)
standard family. The OSI standards are intended to maintain the ease of connections
between heterogeneous networks. CCITT X.400 is a global store-and-forward message
standard for E-mail. CCITT X.400 is frequently viewed as an intercompany messaging,
mail interchange and transport system. The CCITT X.400 protocol will be the basis for
many new applications that use interconnected E-mail system. CCITT X.400's acceptance
has been slowed because the protocol's 1984 version lacked important futures such as
security, but the 1988 version has overcome those limitations. This version offers security
services to guarantee reliability in the global E-mail system. This security issue will be
further addressed in Chapter V. The standard was also enhanced in 1992 to allow
implementation of EDI, Electronic funds transfer (EFT), facsimile and multimedia
applications.
The benefits of using X.400 MHS to carry EDI data include:
- a single communications path using X.400, where customers can expect to
realize economies of scale which allow saving of from 10-30%, over previous multiple
connection solutions depending on volume;
- the ability to exchange messages with multiple trading partners who may
use different messaging systems, networks, or computers;
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- the ability to communicate electronically to trading partners not using EDI;
- the ability to transmit multimedia from one interface (i.e., EDI, E-mail, fax.
telex, etc.);
- enhanced security capabilities including encryption and network- based
acknowledgment of receipt.
b. CCITT X.435
The title for CCITT X.435 "Message handling systems: EDI messaging
system was adopted in 1991. This standard provides a comprehensive blueprint for a
message handling system (MHS). The purpose of an MHS is to enable users to exchange
messages on a store-and-forward basis. A message submitted on behalf of one user, the
originator, is conveyed by the message transfer system (MTS) and subsequently delivered
to the agents, the recipients. Access units (AU) link the MTS to other kinds of
communication systems (e.g., postal systems). A user is assisted in the preparation, storage,
and display of messages by a user agent (UA). Optionally, it is assisted in the storage of
messages by a message store (MS). The MTS comprises a number of message transfer
agents (MTA), which collectively perform the store-and-forward message transfer
function.
The CCITT X.435 defines message handling applications called EDI
messaging (EDIMG). It also defines a form of message handling tailored to the exchange
of EDI information, a new message content type, and associated procedures. It is designed
to meet the requirements of users of ISO 9735 (EDIFACT), and other commonly used EDI
systems. The implementation of the CCITT X.435 standard should enable users to combine
their messaging and EDI networks, which will reduce administrative overhead costs and
simplify network management. In addition, CCITT X.435 contains enhanced security,
tracking, and auditing.
Messages described in CCITT X.435 include the message body parts and the
message envelope. The message body part consists of header, trailer and subbody part. The
13
message envelope for CCITT X.435 specifies that the message which contains an EDI
document, allowing the user to quickly identify and then automatically route incoming
messages to mailboxes or EDI applications. In addition, the CCITT X.435 header gives
users additional information about the documents inside the envelope, such as the name and
address of the sender and the translation software used. This will allow users to sort
messages before processing them. This standard will also let users attach other message
body parts to the message, which might contain such things as computer-aided design
drawings, text files, spreadsheets, and encryption data. The standard enables users to cross-
reference these message body parts with the original EDI document, enabling users to route
the message body parts or documents to different people or applications within the users
without losing track of documents that belong together. Most users interested in CCITT
X.435 are users with well-established EDI programs and CCITT X.400 networks.
Unfortunately, an implementation of CCITT X.435 is not yet possible with commercial
software. IRef. 7]
2. Document content Standards
The second major area for EDI standards is the content of the transaction record
or document itself. It is application oriented. Once reliable communication is established,
it is practically assured that the data sent is in fact the data received. The data format is what
makes the data understood by both trading partners.
Document content standards solve this problem. Since both parties implement
EDI documents in the same format, they can understand each other. As with
communication standards, several document content standards exist. We now separate the
standards into four types:
a. Proprietary Standards
From the beginning of EDI, only one or two companies have dominated the
market. Therefore, those companies implementing EDI must use proprietary standards.
This is especially true when a large hub is trading with a lot of spokes.
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b. Industry-specific Standards
Industry trade groups started by establishing their own standards to address
their special needs. In the U.S., those standards now fall under the ANSI X12 umbrella,
including standards such as Transportation Data Coordinating Committee (TDCC),
Uniform Code Standard (UCS), and Warehouse Information Network Standard (WINS),
etc.
c. National Cross-Industry Standards
ANSI has made a significant contribution to the development of EDI
transactions across industry lines. In 1978, the Credit Research Foundation asked ANSI to
approve the formation of a committee to develop a national cross industry standard for EDI.
ANSI sanctioned the Accredited Standards Committee X12 (ANSI ASC X12) to develop
the necessary standards. This committee was made up of representatives of commercial and
industrial organizations and vendors of services designed to facilitate the use of EDI
standards. The X12 committee's charter not only included the development of a cross
industry standard, but also the development of an entire family of related standards for
electronic exchange of many different types of routine business transactions. Therefore,
these standards have almost universal appeal.
The ANSI X12 standards consists of transaction set standards, data element
dictionary, data segment dictionary and transmission control standards.
Transaction set standards define the format and context of data used within
specified business documents, such as invoices. However, while the invoice transaction set
conveys the functionality of the paper invoice, it does not contain as much descriptive
information since it is not intended for human reading.
The data dictionary contains codes for types of information used in business
documents. The data dictionary reduces vast amounts of information to two-digit codes
(called data elements), and therefore, eliminates the need for descriptive information in an
electronic document.
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The data segment dictionary provides the definition and formats for data
segments. These data segments consist of a precise sequence of data elements, separated by
delimiters.
The transmission control standards define the formats for the information
required to interchange data. Defined within the transmission control standards are data
element delimiters, transaction set separators, and transmission envelope formats. [Ref. 81
d. International Standards
In addition to ANSI ASC X12, there are primarily European standards that
are being developed under the auspices of the United Nations known as UN/EDIFACT, an
upgrade to EDIFACT. In 1985, the Economic Commission for Europe of UN (UN/ECE)
initiated a project to develop intermediate EDI standards based on two existing bodies of
work, ANSI ASC X12 and the UN Guidelines for Trade Data Interchange. Both North
American and European experts were invited to participate. When applying the
international message definitions, subsets are often agreed upon as not all segments are
required.
Obviously, a company should choose an EDI standard that will facilitate
communication with the maximum number of trading partners. In 1991, NIST published its
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 161. This standard has helped to
legitimize EDI in the federal government. FIPS 161 does not mandate the use of an EDI,
but suggests the use of either UN/EDIFACT or the ANSI ASC XI 2. A problem of major
concern to industry is the lack of supporting software and the cost and control problems
associated with running different systems. There will be a great need to have the support of
both ANSI ASC X 12 and EDIFACT in the near future.
H. LEGAL ISSUES
1. Authority Aspects
When deciding to implement an EDI system, the first thing a company will face
is how to replace the old purchasing order forms, invoices, and some other paper work
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related to the original agreement among its trading partners. And. most importantly, who
will sign-off on documents? In fact, most firms participating in the EDI survey thought of
this as a major legal obstacle to the implementation of an EDI system.
2. Trading Partners Agreements
With documents being sent electronically, contract terms and conditions would
no longer be sent to trading partners with each transaction. Often, a standard trading partner
agreement is prepared and signed once, and is considered valid for all EDI transactions.
Usually, the original (non-EDI) agreements' content are the best. Such agreements include:
a. Payment Terms
How fast should the payment be made? Could payments be completed by
electronic funds transfer (EFT)? Such problems need to be stated in the agreement to
prevent future disagreements.
b. Liability
What if documents were forged or modified by unauthorized people? Who is
responsible for a transmission error? What security services and mechanisms are being
used? Who will provide those security tools? All solutions of these problems need to be
clarified in the agreement.
c. Needfor Acknowledgment
EDI provides for instantaneous acknowledgment. This is accomplished in the
"signed receipt requested" letter, when implemented in EDI.
d. Communication Charge
Wlio will pay the data transmission bill? Wliat kind of EDI platform is going
to be used? Wliat documents will be sent by EDI? These questions should also be clearly
stated in the agreement.
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e. Expiration of the Agreement
The effective period should be stated in the agreement. If digital signatures
are applied, the expiration of each signature should be stated.
3. Contracts with EDI Vendors
Liability is the key concern here. Currently, contracts with VANs and software
providers leave the user bearing much of the risk of electronic communications. This
includes loss or alternation of data during transmission and any business losses that may
result. Contracts for off-the-shelf EDI software products are rather inflexible. VAN
contracts may be negotiable, depending on the relative size of the user company.
I. IMPLEMENTATION OF EDI
1. Members Involved In EDI Implementation
EDI's development and installation will first involve at least a steering
committee, including the following members. These members should report to the
corporate executive.
a. Functional Business Managers
Functional business managers with responsibility for EDI feasibility studies
within their own departments need to be involved in the implementation project. Those
departments generally include purchasing, sales, accounting, inventory, etc.
b. Systems and Communications Manager
These people that assist in the technical system specification and the choice
of EDI software and VANs.
c. Auditing and Legal Representatives
The implementation process needs to be monitored by auditing and legal
representatives. All situations that occur during implementation should be reported and
resolved.
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d. Business Managers and Technical Supportfrom Key Trading Partners
Since the feature of EDI is the interchange of information between trading
partners, these partners should support the implementation project of the newcomers that
includes input and output testing, information exchange, transaction set and
implementation scheduling.
e. EDI Consultant
Consultants can provide experience and a broad perspective of EDI as a
whole.
2. Procedures of EDI Implementation
Implementation is the aspect of the EDI project that requires an information
system professional. Implementation should be done in phases. One must pay special
attention to security and data recovery. The basic phases include implementing a pilot
program, running the pilot in parallel with existing systems, bringing up the full-scale
implementation and maintaining the EDI system.
a. Understand EDI and Develop a Strategic Plan
Start planning by developing a complete understanding of EDI and its
implications. The planning phase should involve all departments whose basic functions
will be impacted by the EDI system. Representatives from order sales administration,
product distribution, purchasing, sales and marketing and any other pertinent department
should be involved in the project from the beginning.
(1) Analyze EOT s Opportunity. The first thing to do is to decide whether to
proceed. This can be done by a survey of system needs. The survey includes the volume of
paperwork transaction documents that is handled manually, the number of suppliers, the
length of the internal administration lead-time associated with the purchasing cycle, the
need to develop headcount reductions, the need to increase professionalization of
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purchasing personnel and the requisite from trading partners. These factors will be
weighted by a Icey personnel from top management, e.g., accounting and finance, receiving,
auditing, legal, purchasing and other related departments.
(2) Develop Cost/Benefit Analysis. The cost/benefit analysis will involve a
before/after comparison of the effect of converting paper documents to electronic
transactions. Factors such as reduction in cost per purchase order, integration of supplies
with manufacturing, inventory cycle time reduction, positive integration of buyer/seller,
efforts to improve overall productivity should be analyzed.
(3) Develop Strategic Plan. After analyzing the above factors, the project
manager must make the decision to proceed. If the benefits are perceived to be low, then
the effort should stop. If the perceived benefits appear to outweigh the associated costs, the
work effort should continue. Also, the top management should to start a strategic plan for
the whole project.
b. Form Agreements with Trading Partners
Agreements with trading partners are essential. It doesn't matter how elegant
an EDI system is if no trading partners can access it. Assess the potential trading partners
already have, whether they have pilot projects in the works, and whether they have
requirements that will limit their own EDI implementations.
c. Redesign Business Systems
For the EDI system to be implemented successfully a complete
understanding and mapping the information flow through the business must be a required.
The information flow is then restructured to reap the benefits that automation and EDI
offer. One must map data such as sales and marketing, inventory and general ledger
information. Specify exactly which data will exist in which formats on which computer
systems. Also, it will be necessary to map into automated data flows the paper systems into
automated data flows that generate and use this information. Then redesign these flows
with EDI in mind.
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d. Develop Legal Considerations
Since a written signature contract will not accompany an EDI transmission, a
separate contract governing the terms and conditions associated with doing business by
EDI systems needs to be established. - ' .
e. Develop Auditing Considerations
Since EDI maintains data electronically, specific practices and techniques
will have designed for in the audit process. These procedures will be somewhat differ from
manual practices. The audit should be clearly established and an auditor should participate
in the design and development of EDI applications.
/. Develop System Application Capability
It is important that a prototype EDI application be developed and tested. Data
mapping must be built from the current system to ANSI ASC X12, with a translation
protocol established. First, an interface with the existing system is done through a tile
extraction. Second, software is established for the translation. This will enable the
purchaser and the supplier to understand how the EDI system operates. A prototype is
useful. It should be a much smaller application than a full pilot test and should involve
parties from both the buying and the selling firm.
g. Establish a Pilot Program
Before moving into full-scale EDI production, one can try it out on a small
scale partner base. This is a good time to perform capacity studies, cost saving evaluations
and trial audits. If there are trading partners that are already using EDI, those partners are
good candidates for participation in the pilot program. If firms have multiple internal
enterprises that do business with one another, these are also good candidates for pilot
program partners.
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h. Review Results of the Pilot Program and Modify
Once the pilot program developed and running, it should be run in parallel
with existing paper systems. This phase is critical to work out the bugs in the EDI system
while, maintaining business activities. When all these pilot system is working, a review of
results, a record of errors, and a modification of the system may be made from comparisons
with the old paper system.
I. Reevaluate Benefits and Costs
The EDI effort should be routinely monitored to review progress and
continually improve its use. Problems need to be quickly identified so that solutions maybe
developed to minimize any negative reactions. The EDI project manager and the
implementation committee should have centralized responsibility to make changes in the
EDI system when necessary. This committee should measure error rates from the system
and prompt acceptance of the system. The committee should also be concerned with an
audit function. They should document the apparent financial and nonfinancial costs and
benefits associated with EDI. TTie reevaluation report will be delivered to top management
as the reference of the next step. [Ref. 9]
J. JOBS OF EDI VENDORS
1. Impiefnentation
Vendors need to help coordinate EDI program implementation. The company will
help assess users' needs, identify and develop the necessary transactions, install mainframe
software, and assist in integrating users' current applications with the EDI system. Vendors
should communicate with users' trading partners and coordinate their installation and
implementation schedules. They will also provide ongoing follow-up and support.
2. Installation
Vendors have to offer "hot-site" technical support for its software installation. If
required, on-site installation support must be available.
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3. Training
Vendors need to regularly offer training for EDI software users. These training
courses must be available at the vendors' place or the users" facility.
4. Technical Support
Vendors should have the abilities to provide "hot-line" technical support for its
users, such as a question deck service or on-line problem solving system. Since the EDI
systems will involve more than a single software package, integration and interoperability
techniques should be provided by the vendor.
5. Hub/spoke Testing
Vendors should provide a variety of services for EDI implementation. These
include coordinating and testing trading partners' EDI implementations to ensure that
documents and transactions are performing as planned.
6. Network Connection Services
Vendors need to coordinate the connection of a user's trading partners to the
network of the user's choice. In addition, vendors act as the agent for several of the major
van's, providing a turnkey EDI solution for hubs and spokes.
7. Serving Beta-site Report
It could be possible that vendors do not have the practical installation experience
with the precise configuration that your organization requires. The organization may
request to serve as a beta-site for the vendor. A beta-site user tests the new product in a real-
world environment. In this situation many bugs may be discovered and fixed by working
with the vendor.
8. Maintenance
Vendors should provide software updates to users regularly, incorporating new
features and capabilities, as well as updates and changes of the EDI standards. Maintenance
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of the EDI system requires dedicated IS resources. The paper maintenance once handled by
clerks, such as maintaining lists of suppliers, managing databases of customer addresses,
or ordering various forms, will shift to electronic maintenance done by IS personnel.
Maintenance also means a continuing responsibility for monitoring and enhancements of
the system. New partners will be brought on board periodically, different forms may need
to be issued or received, with software upgrades and installation enhancements added as
experience is gained.
K. AUDITING OF EDI
A company's use of EDI will have a profound effect on auditing activities as follows.
1. Payment Validation
One aspect of EDI is the validation of payment. This involves the reconciliation
of the invoice with the purchase order and with the receiving documents to ensure correct
payment. All of these documents are now computerized. Time and money will be saved
compared to the manual process.
2. Audit Trail of Activities
Written signatures are replaced with codes and IDs. A date/time stamp should be
used to keep track of all activities. There should be a requirement to identify each user to
track the point of access and the data flow within the company. Also, the recording of
authorization is critical to the EDI system. All of those can be achieved by the technology
of electronic authentication and verification, such as a digital signature scheme. Lastly, a
specific audit trail database is necessary.
3. Order and Payment Control
This activity requires security mechanisms to provide safeguards of the system to
ensure only authorized sources can place orders and initiate payments. After the
implementation of EDI, there will be less human involvement in the procedure and only
24
operators will deal with it ( which means less control by authorization.) The training of these
operators should be emphasized.
4. Accounting and Transaction Correspondence
Comparison of accounting record with actual transactions can insure that internal
company data reflects actual inventory and dollar figures. All files are computerized, and
there is no need for paper backup to verify records. So, spot checks of actual transactions
with system files and verification of assets with different non-EDI data are very important.
To assist in the auditing process, the company may generate accounting reports from EDI
data within the company and from all their trading partners" records.
L. BARRIERS TO EDI
When the concept of EDI is introduced into corporations, several barriers may occur.
When an organization decides to implement EDI, fundamental changes occurs in the way
of doing business. Not all of those changes will be accepted by the organizations. Some
become the barriers to the willingness to implement EDI. The largest obstacle to successful
EDI implementation is the "distribution of EDI information" and "education," according to
60% of large-scale EDI users surveyed. IRef. 10]
1. Distribution of EDI Information
Many potential trading partners in small and midsize firms are still unaware of
EDI, despite years of effort to spread the news by private educational firms, EDI standards
organizations and industry groups. EDI VANs are increasingly supporting this need by
running implementation training sessions and expanding user meetings to focus on trading
partner support.
2. Education and Training
The need for education is also important as EDI expands into new areas and as
new industry groups implement EDI standards for communication among their members.
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EDI education and training is a problem of many firms. Relying on vendors' training is not
enough for the future development of EDI.
3. Adding Partners
The first and most pressing problem for hub implementations is the cost of adding
trading partners. One way to keep costs low is to work closely with a VAN to get trading
partners up and running. Most VANs offer trading partner support through optional
consulting services and "hub" programs that identify, train and install EDI technology for
smaller spoke partners of a VAN customer.
4. Communication Costs on the Rise
EDI hub companies in particular have to deal with the fact that as their EDI
volume grows, communication costs rise. As total VAN communication costs increase, the
likelihood exist that EDI hubs will move their EDI transmissions onto a dedicated EDI
platform, bypassing the VANs. In essence, the hub can set up its own VAN and
communicate directly with its many trading partners. The major VANs are sure to counter
this trend with even lower communications costs for their largest customers. Some accept
bulk transfers of messages sent during off hours and then sort and send messages later.
Regardless of the eventual configuration of the VAN market, it is clear that EDI users can
expect total EDI communication costs to keep rising, as partners are added. However, per-
transaction costs will decrease over time.
5. Language Difference
International trading is becoming more common and the current restriction that
EDI be transmitted in English seems questionable. Language translation systems, which




EDI is best suited for high-volume, highly rigid order handling. It can't cope well
with one-time, sporadic orders and customizing.
7. Contractual Problems
EDI doesn't contain with delivery arrangements, insuring of transported goods,
tax issues, and other business aspects that are considered "contractual" between trading
partners. [Ref. 11]
8. High Integration Cost
The integration of EDI cost is high. Many firms are using applications developed
long before the advent of EDI; the cost of modifying or in some case, replacing these
applications may be significant.
9. Various Proprietary Implementations
Different proprietary implementations are provided by different vendors. This
will make it difficult for participants to decide which one to choose. This is especially true
when different trading partners are using different proprietary implementations.
10. Implement EDI Means Starting Over
The use of EDI with new participants is a new phenomenon. All the processing
procedures will have to be modified by the new technology.
11. Lack of Security " '"
The security of E-mail is not well understood, and the security of the receiving
documents is not easy to authenticate. This security issue is not so much that EDI
documents will be forged. It also includes the security of the platform (network) that is
used, the security management to be built inside the organization, and the security
agreement between both sides of the trading partners.
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12. Legal Position is not Clear
Fraud statutes mandate that certain transactions be signed and in writing. These
requirements are unclear in the context of EDI. How do users keep adequate legal records
of transactions when electronic records may be easily altered by those with -adequate
knowledge?
13. Lack of Integration
Most mainframe, midrange or front-end software packages offer some kind of
mapping utility, including creation of special maps, ability to divert errors or exceptions for
special processing, ability to enter bar-code data, and the ability to move any portion of data
to or from EDI transaction sets to or from any portion of the application record. For any set
of companies not using an entire set of sequences, there are still manual points where data
has to be reentered. That interrupts a smooth, seamless data flow. This type of integration
is the most complicated and sophisticated part of an EDI implementation. However, this
will become the most beneficial aspect of EDI as a whole.
14. Dual System Problem
It is not easy for each company implementing an EDI pilot system to keep on
doing the paper work. The benefits of EDI will not be realized if only a small fraction of
trading partners participate and the rest continue to use a paper-based system. Even if only
one trading partner continues to use a manual system, another partner will have to keep two
systems to keep the business.
M. SUCCESS FACTORS OF EDI
According to a recent report by Market Intelligence, an international research firm
specializing in telecommunication and information technologies, worldwide EDI revenues
will grow eightfold, from $250 million in 1991 to nearly $2 billion in 1998 [Ref. 11].
There are four factors that make EDI a success.
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1. Business Process Engineering
When businesses install EDI, they must face the problem of whether their
business process is healthy or not. The approach should be a methodical, often structured,
approach to initiating fundamental organizational changes by means of critically evaluating
business activities. This involves the discarding or reworking of ineffective or inessential
processes. New approaches are built that utilize new technology, to achieve major
breakthroughs in improved business performance. This engineering work may allow
businesses to rethink the cycle of the business process, to standardize and rationalize the
processes.
2. Standardization and Infrastructure
As mentioned in the "standard of EDI" and the "platform of EDI",
standardization and infrastructure make users more efficient.
3. Automation and Flexible Computing
The broad family of EDI software fits comfortably with a range of computer
platform architectures, operating on mainframes, minicomputers and desktop (primarily
DOS) machines. It may be used with both proprietary and UNIX environments. UNIX
solutions have been emerging during the last two years, as EDI translation software for
standardized transaction sets is critically important. As the mission-critical nature of EDI
evolves, organizations are making decisions on the selection of EDI platforms, also
including fault-tolerant machines.
There are several differences between the hub and the spoke. First of all, the two
are using different computing platforms. Large companies will operate in mainframe
environments with software purchased from independent software vendors. The spoke
firms, sometimes small companies or companies enforced by their trading partners, may be
operating on PCs or minicomputers and choosing software as compatible as possible with
the requirements of hubs. The small firms will follow the EDI standards that have been
dictated by the large hub firms, predominantly based on ANSI ASC XI 2.
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The VANs have complex software requirements for message and transaction
management services. These services are required to maintain the integrity of the envelope
and the transaction set. This integrity may have to be maintained across more than one
VAN.
4. Integration and Interoperabiliity
It is very important to the companies who apply EDI to manage application
integration and interoperability to achieve success. The integration and interoperabiliity
areas have organizational, platform and software components associated with them. The
organizational issues are very complex and largely applicable to business process
reengineering. Standards, and communications issues are mainly software issues.
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ni. FUNDAMENTALS OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE
A. INTRODUCTION
A digital signature (DS) is a digital signal, represented as a string of bits that attests
to the authenticity of the document to which it is attached. Like handwritten signatures, it
tends to be unique and easily applied to a specific sender. The first description of the
concept of DS was in Diffe and Hellman's paper, "Multiuser cryptographic techniques",
1976. This was further discussed in Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) in 1978,"A
Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public Key Cryptosystems" [Ref. 12]. This
became known as the RSA algorithm. In 1992, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NTST) proposed the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) based on the El
Gamal's signature scheme [Ref. 13].
A digital signature is a message-dependent bit-pattern, and the signing process
transforms the message into the signed message (or signature). This transformation, called
the digital signature scheme, will be discussed in a later section. In general, the receiver can
verify the DS as an authentication of the sender. The essential properties of the digital
signature are that it is easy to produce, easy to authenticate, but difficult to forge.
DS is an important area of study because the lack of secure authentication has been a
major obstacle of document digitalization. DS makes it possible to convert existing paper
documents into an electronic form (like EDI).
B. LEGAL STATUS OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE
1. Introduction
The purpose of DS is to replace handwritten signatures. This means that DS must
approach or equal the legality of hand written signatures. Currently, if two companies wish
to digitally sign a series of contracts, it is recommended that they first sign a paper contract
in which they agree in the future to be bound by any contracts digitally signed by them
using a given signature method and minimum key size. NIST has stated that its proposed
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Digital Signature Standard (DSS) should be capable of "proving to a third party that the
data was actually signed by the generator of the signature."
2. Law Related to Digital Signatures
The legal significance of signatures and the use of writings bearing such
signatures must be viewed from a perspective which encompass several branches of the
law, including but not limited to the statute of Frauds, the Law of Acknowledgments, the
Law of Agency, and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The need for a device or
process which satisfies the requirement of such branches of law in the context of electronic
signamres can be appreciated by understanding some key areas of the law affecting hand-
written signatures. The statute of Frauds began in 1677 and was enacted in England. It was
designed to prevent fraud by excluding from consideration by the courts legal actions on
certain contracts, unless there was written evidence of the agreement signed by the party to
be charged or his duly authorized agent. [Ref. 14]
a. Law ofAcknowledgments
Certain documents require acknowledgment or proof of the identity of the
person who signs the document, and proof that it was signed on the stated date. This
acknowledgment or proof is necessary to prevent the person who signed the document from
claiming later that the signature is not genuine. Moreover, certain transactions require that
the signature be witnessed by one or more persons. Such transactions may vary according
to the law of the jurisdiction in which the document was executed.
Acknowledgment or proof of signature upon a legal document or instrument
may normally be made before a judge, an official examiner or title, an official referee, or a
notary public. Essentially, the form of an acknowledgment consists of the date the
document was signed, names or parties involved, and notary public. Such acknowledgment
together with the signed document are usually recorded in an official registry, like an office
of the county clerk or secretary of state.
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b. Law ofAgency
The principles of agency law are essential for the conduct of business
transactions. A corporation, as a legal entity, can function only through its agents. The law
of partnership is to a large degree a special application of agency principles to that
particular form of business organization. Agency is the fiduciary relation (involving a
confidence or trust) which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to
another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the
other so to act.
As a general rule, no particular formalities are required to create an agency
relationship. The appointment may be either written or oral, and the relationship may be
either expressed or implied. There are two situations in which formalities are required: ( 1
)
with a power of attorney, where a formally acknowledged instrument is used for conferring
authority upon the agent; and (2) in a few states where it is required that the act which
confers authority to perform a certain act must possess the same formalities as the act to be
performed.
Generally, the law of agency applies to contracts or commercial paper. A
principal (the person from whom an agent's authority derives) is bound by the duly
authorized acts of his agent. If the agent does not possess the requisite authority, the
principal in the most instances will not be bound. An agent who fails to bind his principal
to an agreement because of the agent's failure to name the principal, or due to lack of the
agent's authority, will usually be personally liable to third parties. Thus, the correct way for
an agent to execute a contract or instrument is to affix the name of his principal followed
by his own signature.
c. Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is a comprehensive modernization
and compilation of the various statutes relating to commercial transactions. Its primary
objectives is to provide uniformity of commercial law throughout American jurisdictions.
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The present articles relating to commercial paper, banking transactions, and investment
securities are paper- based.
To accommodate electronic funds transfer systems, a special committee was
formed to prepare amendments or supplements to these articles. Although the principles
governing the transfer of paper-based stocks and bonds can generally be made applicable
to the paperless variety, many technical and mechanical changes are needed to apply those
principles to securities without certificates. According to the UCC,
'Signed" includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to
authenticate a writing. [UCC:Sec.21-201(39)]
and, in case of commercial paper,
A signature is made by use of any name, including any trade or assumed name, upon an
instrument, or by any word or mark used in lieu of a written signature.
[UCC:Sec.3-401(2)|
The inclusion of the word authenticate in the definition of signed clearly indicates that a
complete handwritten signature is not necessary. This authentication may be printed, typed,
stamped, or written; it may be initials or thumbprint. It may be on any part of the document,
and in certain cases may be found in a billhead or letterhead. No catalog of possible
authentication can be complete, and courts must use common sense and commercial
experience in passing upon such matters. The question is always whether the symbol was
executed or adopted by the party with the intention at that time of authenticating the
writing.
A signattire may be made by an agent or other representative, and his
authority to make such a signature may be established according to the Law of Agency. No
particular form of appointment is necessary to establish such authority. Such signature may
be unauthorized if made by an agent who exceeds his actual, or apparent authority. An
unauthorized signature is one made without actual, implied, or apparent authority, and
includes those made by forgers, impostors, and fictitious payees.
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The law of commercial paper also recognized the principle that the drawer,
the one who creates a negotiable instrument, has voluntarily entered into relationships
beyond his control with subsequent holders of the instrument. The law imposes on the
drawer the responsibility of material alteration of the instrument later in the chain of
transfer.
3. Legalizing Digital Signatures
With the lack of an overall statute governing paperless commercial transactions
via electronic communications network, parties are free to enter into their own agreements.
If disagreements arise later, the party seeking to enforce the contract will prevail only if the
agreement complied with certain basic legal requirements. These requirements may include
the provisions of statutes of frauds, acknowledgment, recording, and reasonableness.
Modem statutes of frauds require some writing which indicates that a contract for sale has
been made between the parties at a defined price, that it reasonably defines the subject
matter, and that it is signed by either the party against whom enforcement is sought or by
his duly authorized agent. Then, the digital signature can be legally accepted without doubt.
If the initial written agreement defines the procedures and protocols of the utilization of the
digital signature by both participants, then the problems of legality of digital signature will
be solved. The initial written agreement will be discussed in the next session.
4. Initial Agreement and Legality of Signatures
Before we use digital signatures to generate signatures for legal usage, we have to
make hand written signature agreements that govern their use.
In any case, the protocol for resolving disputes must be defined and agreed upon
by both parties in advance. Different protocols determine different signature schemes even
though the signing and verifying transformation may be the same. Although, both the laws
and legal precedent regarding signed paper documents are well established, the situation
regarding digital signatures is not as clear. It seems that, at present, if digital signatures are
to have any standing in law, then an initial written agreement between the parties concerned
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is required. This agreement should define the procedures for obtaining a digital signature,
how it would be recorded, what each party's commitment would be and how disputes
would be resolved. If one party to this agreement felt that another party had not honored his
commitment then he could test this in court.
The legal problems are not as simple as mentioned above. There will be many of
them that need to be addressed, such as the means of authenticating the signature, the
obligation of a user to ensure the security of his signing transformation, the means of
resolving disputes, penalties for the misuse of digital signatures, the use of stolen keys,
signing false statements or misdating signed messages, and the action required in case of
compromised keys. It will take a long time for adequate legislation to be introduced.
C. METHODS FOR DIGITAL SIGNATURE
1. Arbitrated Signature
Signed messages can be sent only by a trusted third party called the arbitrator. The
recipient may be unable to verify the sender's signature direcdy, but is assured of its
validity through the mediation of the arbitrator. The arbitrator is trusted by both parties and
can give the confidence to the sender and recipient that the sender's signatures will not be
forged and the recipient's received signatures are valid. In the real world, an arbitrator may
be a banker or a lawyer. In computing environments, it could be a person, program or
machine that manages application programs running on machine of the network.
2. Universal Signature
A universal signature (or so called true signature) is one in which the signer sends
the signature directly to the receiver who is able to verify the signature without recourse to
a third party. In this case, the signature acts as a broadcast cipher and all users can verify
the origin of the message. However, only the sender can generate the signature from the
original message. This is defined as a one-way authentication in Diffie and Hellman's paper
[Ref. 15]. In arbitrated signature schemes, the receiver needs the cooperation of the
arbitrator to perform verification of the signature. The true signature scheme relies on the
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use of a special type of signature generation and verification called a one-way function. The
fundamental property of this function is that it is easy to implement but hard to invert. One
particular function is the trapdoor one-way function. It is a one-way function that allows
someone in possession of specific secret information (the trapdoor) to compute an inverse.
Several digital signature schemes based on one-way function and their trapdoors have been
published. The concept of public key cryptosystem is based on a trapdoor one-way
function.
Usually, the choice of digital signature schemes should be included within the
initial written agreement or recorded in a designated registry that is available to the
participants in advance. But it may also involve certain secret and/or nonsecret information
provided to the receiver at the time the message is validated. [Ref. 16]
D. GENERAL SETTINGS OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE
1. Symmetric Key Cryptography
In a symmetric cryptosystem (sometimes called private key, single key. secret
key, or conventional cryptosystem), both the encryption transformation and decryption
transformation are determined by the same key. The secrecy of the key guarantees the
authenticity of the message. The security of the encryption method is completely dependent
on how well the key is protected. The Data Encryption Standard algorithm (called DEA by
ANSI in standard X3.92 and DES in Federal Information Processing Standard 46), is a
private key algorithm. The main problem is getting the sender and receiver to agree on the
secret key without anyone else finding out. If they are in separate physical locations, they
must trust a courier, or a phone system, or some other transmission system to not disclose
the secret key they are communicating. Anyone who overhears or intercepts the key in
transit can later read all messages encrypted using that key. This secret key cryptosystem
process makes it difficult to ensure secure key management.
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2. Public Key Cryptography
As stated in the above section the public key cryptosystem was invented in 1976
by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman. It is based on the trapdoor one-way function. This
cryptosystem may be used to solve the key management problem. But, this very first public
key algorithm cannot be used for encrypting messages by itself, but is used to exchange
keys to be used with other cryptosystems, and also for identification and related purposes.
The security of the Diffie-Hellman public key system is based on the mathematical
difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem. For this scheme to be secure, the keys should
be long.
In the public key system, the key comes in inverse pairs. A message that is
encrypted by one key can be decrypted by the other, but the possession of the public key
does not allow the discovery of the other key. The separation of encryption and decryption
makes it possible to display the member's public key in public and to achieve
communication by the simple protocols:
a. Anybody using the public key (found in the public directory) can send a private
message to the one who holds the encryption of the public key, but only that person can
decrypt the message.
b. Any person can sign a message with his own secret key and everybody can
authenticate that message by the corresponding public key. But, nobody can forge that
message without the secret key (thus, the sender cannot deny he sent it.)
Protocol a. is the application of privacy or encryption and protocol b. could be
used as a digital signature for authentication. This is a tremendous help for conventional
end-to-end security in large communication networks. TTius, this cryptosystem can instill
trust in a business telecommunication network. The availability of a signature that the
receiver of a message cannot forge and the sender cannot disavow makes it possible to have
negotiations and transactions. [Ref 17]
Increased security is the primary advantage of a public key cryptosystem. The
secret keys do not need to be transmitted or communicated to anyone. The primary
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disadvantage is that speed of generating a pair of public keys and secret keys is slow,
compared to the conventional secret key system. ...
3. Scheme with Probabilistic Verification
In arbitrated signatures, the signer shares his secret signing information with the
arbitrator. This allows the arbitrator to verify a signature and pass on this assurance to the
recipient. After signing the message, the signer reveals only part of his secret signing
information (one of the subsets) to the recipient. This allows him to have confidence in the
signature. The verification of the signature can be made, only when the signer reveals his
secret signing information to arbitrator. The receiver's verification is a probabihstic
verification. To validate this signature, the recipient randomly chooses a subset of the
whole signing information and asks the signer to reveal the same subset. Then, the recipient
verifies the revealed subset of the signing information by comparison. If and only if there
is an exact match does the recipient accept the signature.
Any signature scheme of this type must be a one-time signature scheme which
means the signer's secret information can be used to sign only one message. Thus, the
scheme must have a registry of validating information used in the verifying process to
validate the signer's revealed secret signing information. r
E. IMPLEMENTATIONS OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEMES
1. El GamaPs Signature Scheme
El Gamal [Ref. 18] has proposed a public key cryptosystem and a digital signature
scheme based on discrete logarithms. This scheme has the advantage that the public
enciphering key and the public information used in the verifying transformation are the
same. El Gamafs scheme was the basis for several signature methods that followed,
including the one by Schnorr [Ref 19], which because the basis for the Digital Signature
Standard (DSS) proposed by NIST.
39
2. The Fiat-Shamir Signature Scheme
This scheme is based on interactive zero-knowledge protocols, but may be
adapted for signatures. It is faster than RSA and is probably equivalent to factoring, but the
signamres are much larger than RSA signatures.
3. The (joldwasser-Micali-Rivest Signature Scheme
Papers by Goldwasser and Micali and by Blum and Goldwasser introduced the
probabilistic encryption method [Ref. 20]. Probabilistic encryption has the attraction of
being resistant to a guessed ciphertext attack, but at a cost of data expansion. In this method,
an attacker sees a ciphertext, guesses that the message might be "Attack at dawn", and
encrypts his guess with the public key of the recipient. By comparison with the actual
ciphertext, he will know if he was correct. This attack can be thwarted by appending some
random bits to the message. At the same time, Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest define a
specially designed permutation method and signature scheme that relies on the fact that
squaring modulo n (where n = pq with p and q secret large primes) is a trapdoor one-way
function. The signature scheme of Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest show a tree structure to
generate authenticated verification parameters. Different values for the verification
parameters may be used for different messages. These various authenticated verification
parameters can sign messages, and later on verify them.
4. Digital Signature Using Rabin's Public Key Cryptosystem
Rabin proposed a system based on a one-way function that also uses the product
of two large primes which is probably equivalent to factoring. This system has an
advantage over RSA, where one may still have a lingering worry about an attack unrelated
to factoring. Rabin's method is suspectable to an active chosen message attack, in which
the attacker tricks a signer into signing a certain message.
Rabin's public key cryptosystem is not immediately acceptable as a digital
signature scheme, since it is not possible to sign all the message by its decryption secret key
after enciphering those messages. [Ref. 21] However, it is possible to combine this
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cryptosystem with a suitably chosen hashing function to provide digital signatures. This
will be explained in the next section.
5. Digital Signature Using RSA
RSA is a public key cryptosystem for both encryption and authentication, it was
invented in 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman, all professors of MIT.
RSA is part of many official standards worldwide. The OSI 9796 standard lists RSA as an
acceptable cryptographic algorithm, as does the CCITT X.509 security standard.
RSA is part of both the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT) standard and the French financial industry's ETEBAC 5
standard. Also, the Australian Digital Signature Standard specifies RSA.
A major advantage of RSA over other public key cryptosystems is that it can be
used for both encryption and authentication. Though RSA was developed 15 years ago and
several signature schemes have been proposed after it, none have been successfully broken
by any attacker [Ref. 22].
F. HASH FUNCTION
1. Introduction
A hash function is a computation that takes a variable size input and returns a
string of fixed size, called the hash value. If the hash function is hard to invert, it is also
called a message-digest function, and the result is called message digest. The name hash
function has many synonyms, e.g., compression function, contraction function, message
digest, fingerprint and cryptographic checksums [Ref. 23].
Digital signatures and hash functions can provide authentication and verification
of message integrity at the same time. Another reason to combine hash functions with
digital signatures is that the use of public key systems to generate signatures is much slower
than conventional ciphers, such as Data Encryption Standard (DES). Other digital signature
schemes are also relatively slow. Furthermore, some schemes produce signatures
comparable in size to, and in some cases larger than, the message they sign. This results in
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data expansion and an effectively lower bandwidth of transmission. Thus, it is usually not
desirable to apply a digital signature directly to a long message. Probabilistic cryptographic
algorithms (as mentioned in the digital signature setting), such as DES or the public-domain
MD5, may be used as a one-way hash function to facilitate pattern matching of numerous
huge data strings or files.
There are some problems with hash function. A collision could occur when two
distinct messages are hashed into the same value. A proposed hash function must create
message digests at a minimum length by padding in order to prevent attacks based on
exhaustive search. For example, if a hash function produces 100-bit numbers, an exhaustive
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search would take 2 attempts on the average to match a given value, and approximately
2 attempts on an average to find two inputs producing the same digest [Ref. 24].
However, just being long enough doesn't guarantee the security of a hash function. The use
of timestamp or sequence numbers in messages may prevent this problem.
2. Implementations of Hash Function
a. Message Digest (MD)
As mentioned above, the MD is the result of a hash function. Examples of
MD are public-domain MD2, MD4 and MD5. Those are widely used hash functions
designed by Ron Rivest specifically for cryptographic applications. The algorithm
produces 128-bit "fingerprints" or MDs. It is conjectured that it is computationally
infeasible to produce two messages having the same MD, or to produce any message
having a given perspective target message digest. The MD5 algorithm, as a case, is
intended for digital signature applications where a large file must be compressed in a secure
manner before being encrypted with a private (secret) key under a public key cryptosystem.
[Ref. 25]
Apart from their use with DS, cryptographic hash functions can provide
origin verification and integrity protection for the message by appending a message digest
prior to encryption. Generalizing this application to the case where a message is to be sent
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to more than one recipient, much cryptoprocessing can be saved by computing a single MD
and then encrypting it differently for each intended recipient.
b. Secure Hash Standard
The Secure Hash Standard (SHS) is a hash function proposed by NIST. It is
designed for use with its proposed DSS. It produces a 160-bit hash value from a variable
size input. SHS is structurally similar to MD4 and MD5. It is 25% slower than MD5 but
may be more secure, because it produces message digests that are 257c longer than the MD
functions [Ref. 26].
c. CCITT X.509 Recommended Hash Functions
CCITT X.509 recommended the requirements that hash function must be
one-way and collision-free. Also, X.509 recommended the signing of a digital signature on
the information summary after the information summary is produced by one-way hash
function.
G. APPLICATIONS
1. Public Key Certification
Public key cryptosystems have advantages over conventional cryptosystems
when used for key management, especially when network communication is used. In this
system, every user's public key is signed by a certification authority (CA). Then, this key
is stored in the public key list. The CA must be trusted, and its public verification
transformation must be known to all users of the system with a need to know. The key
together with the signature is then usually referred to as a certificate for that user.
In practice, it is necessary for the certificate to contain the name of the key owner,
as well as the public key itself. In addition, the certificate may also contain an expiration
date and/or an identifier for the algorithm with which the public key is to be u.sed. The
importance of the use of a one-way hash function is to prevent manipulation of the signed
data and the certificates.
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Certification of public keys is one of the most confidential application areas for
digital signatures. The 1988 version of the CCITT X.500 Directory Recommendations
specifies how public key certificates may be stored in user directories, and CCITT X.509
provides a security framework for these directories. This application of digital signatures
has also been adopted to provide key management for Internet electronic mail security.
CCITT Recommendation X.509 also makes the provision for the case where more
than one CA is used. This is done by allowing CAs to produce certificates for each other's
public verification transformations. Sequences of such cross-certificates can be used to
enable a user to obtain an authenticated copy of a CA's public verification transformation,
and to check a key certificate produced by that CA. However, CCITT X.509 does not
mandate which digital signature should be used. It is recommended that the secret signature
process should be identical to the decryption process for a public key cryptosystem.
2. Applications of RSA Cryptosystem
Rather than the old symmetric cryptosystems, the RSA system uses a matched
pair of encryption and decryption keys instead of using the same key to both encrypt and
decrypt the data. Each key performs a one-way transformation upon the data. Each key is
the inverse function of the other; what one does only the other can undo. The RSA public
key is made publicly available by its owner, while the RSA private key is kept secret. To
send a private message, an author scrambles the plaintext with the intended recipient's
public key. Once so encrypted, the message can only be decoded with the recipient's
private key. Inversely, a user may also scramble data using his private key. In other words,
RSA keys work in either direction. This provides the basis for the digital signature. If a
message may be unscrambled with someone's public key. their private key must be used to
scramble it in the first place. Since only the owner can utilize his own private key. the
scrambled message becomes an electronic signature - a document that nobody else can
produce.
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The applications using RSA algonthm and other security mechanisms are
provided as follows:
a. The RSA Digital Envelope
RSA also provides a new level of privacy, which is called the RSA Digital
Envelope (Trademark by RSA). Secure communication is not possible without any
previous relationship between parties. Electronic mail may be sealed in a cryptographic
"envelope" so that only the intended recipient can read it, despite the use of public
communication channels or storage. No sharing or distribution of the secret keys is
necessary. The process is as simple as dialing a person's telephone number. Combining
RSA and DES provides a good solution. RSA handles key management and authentication
and DES is used for bulk data encryption. In practice, the RSA algorithm may be combined
with any other traditional "symmetric-block" or shared-key cipher, of which DES is just
one example. The message author generates a random DES key every time he/she writes a
message. When the message is completed, it is encrypted using this DES random key with
the recipient's public key, then sent. Only the intended recipient may use his/her private key
to recover the DES key, and then use it to decode the message. [Ref. 27]
b. RSA Digital Certificate
The RSA Digital Certificate is a practical product currently being used by
industry. It is actually a copy of the author's public key that has itself been "digital signed"
by a mutually trusted authority, such as a network security director. Every time someone
sends you a message, they attach their certificate. The recipient of the message first uses
the certificate to verify that the author's public key is authentic, then uses that public key
to verify the message itself. In this way. only the public key, of the certifying authority has
to be centrally stored or widely publicized. Anyone else can simply transmit their public
key and vaUd certificate with their messages.
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Using RSA digital certificates, an authentication chain can be established that
corresponds to the organizational hierarchy, allowing convenient public key registration
and certification in a distributed environment. [Ref 28]
c. The RSA Digital Signature and Message Digest
The RSA Digital Signature not only reveals the identity of the author, but
verifies the contents of a document as well. Identification of the author is provided by a
basic property of the RSA cryptosystem. That is, when one decodes a message from
someone using his/her public key, the message must have come from him/her, because only
the correct private key could produce a coded message that descrambles with the matching
public key. The checking of someone's handwritten signature against a previously
produced sample signature is not the same as producing that signature. Likewise, with
RSA, the public key verifies the private key as the source but reveals next to nothing about
the corresponding private key. No secrets have to be shared and two people who have never
communicated before may exchange messages with confidence of the recipient's identity.
Handwritten signatures identify the author of a document, and vouch for the document's
integrity. The RSA Digital Signature employs a cryptographic "hashing" algorithm to
create an MD that is unique to each document, much like a fingerprint. If even a single bit
of the document is changed, roughly 50% of the bits in the corresponding MD will change.
Furthermore, the hashing algorithm is a one-way function: the document content cannot be
reconstructed from the bits of the MD. Scrambling this MD with the author's private key
produces the RSA Digital Signature, which is then attached to the document.
MD4, the MD algorithm used in RSA products, was developed by Dr. Ronald
Rivest. It is fast becoming the worldwide de facto standard. MD4 is the fastest, most secure
algorithm of its type. With its 128 bit message digest, the probability that different
documents will have the same digest by coincidence is less than 1 in a trillion, effectively
ensuring that two MDs will only match if they are identical. If someone receives a file with
an RSA Digital Signature attached, the signature is separated from the document. Then, the
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recipient uses MD4 to compute an independent MD based on the document he received.
The recipient's program then descrambles the signature block with the author's public key
to obtain the original MD, and then compresses it. If the two MDs match, the signature is
undoubtedly authentic and the document has not been altered since its signing, either by
tampering, virus infection, or transmission errors. [Ref. 29]
d. Public Key Cryptosystem Standard (PKCS) by RSA.
The new Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) have a number of
components, called PKCS #1, #3, #5, #6, #7, #8 and #9. It is proposed for incorporation in
future OSI (Open System Interconnection) Standards. PKCS #1 describes a method for
encrypting data using the RSA public-key cryptosystem. producing signed data by digital
signature, and transmitting messages by digital envelopes. For digital signatures, the
content to be signed is first reduced to a message digest algorithm (such as MD4,MD5 ), and
then an 8-bit string containing the message digest is encrypted with the RSA private key of
the signer of the content. PKCS #1 also defines two digital signature algorithms for use in
signing CCITT X.509/PEM certificates and certificate-revocation lists (CRLs), and other
objects employing digital signatures, such as CCITT X.400 message tokens.
3. Authentication Using Digital Signature
The traditional way for communicating parties to verify one another's identity in
computer networks is by using passwords. One of the alternatives is the use of
cryptographic authentication protocols, for which standards are now emerging. Some of the
most important of these protocols are based on digital signatures. CCITT Recommendation
X.5C)9 specifies three different protocols for authentication, all based on the use of digital
signauires. All of these protocols are based on the use of a cryptographic data structure
called a token. Like a certificate, a token is merely a series of data items with a signature
appended. In general, tokens are used when a single communication occurred between two
parties. [Ref. 30]
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4. Electronic Mail Security Based on Digital Signatures
The 1988 version of the CCITT X.400 series of recommendations support a
variety of security services, based on the use of digital signatures and public key
cryptosystems. Key management is based on the use of public key certificates, as specified
in CCITT X.509 which had been mentioned in the "Public Key Certification" section
above. End-to-end security services are almost all based on the use of a structure called
message-tokens, whose general form is similar to that of the token described in Section 3
above. Tokens are also present in the authentication protocols used by pairs of
communicating CCITT X.400 entities. [Ref. 31]
5. Certificate-based Systems Employ Digital Signature
Digital signatures may be employed for authentication in the process of
distributing public components in public key systems. In particular, if the system is
certificate-based, the central issuing authority can sign certificates containing public
components.
The notion of a CA can be extended to a hierarchical structure or tree structure.
The CA serves as the root of the tree; leaves represent users. Intermediate nodes will be
arranged in several levels and also represent users. Each node of the tree is responsible for
authenticating its children. Thus, an authentication path is an organization; the organization
may certify a unit; the unit may certify an individual user. Certification may be
accomplished by having a parent node sign a certificate for the child node. To validate
another user's certificate, a user may request the entire authentication path.
It is also possible for the tree to be replaced by a forest. For example, in a
multinational system there may be a different tree for each country. Here, the roots must
certify each other. An authentication path may then pass through two or more roots. More
generally, an authentication structure can be an arbitrary directed graph, with a directed
edge from A to B if A certifies B. Then, authentication paths may be constructed by
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conjoining directed paths from two users to a common trusted node. This application is
similar to the use of public key certification. [Ref. 32]
6. Signatures by Tamper-Resistent Electronic seal
There is a separation between encryption and decryption in a public key
cryptosystem that makes such systems candidates for digital signature schemes. Since each
of the two functions has its own key, it is possible to verify a signature using encryption
without being able to generate a signature which requires decryption. For conventional
systems, the same separation of keys does not exist. If the encryption and decryption
transformations were successfully separated, then it would be possible to provide
signatures using such a system. One way of achieving this separation is by physical means
using tamper-resistant modules (TRMs) by a Tamper Detection System (TDS). Electronic
seals generate random numbers or record the date and the time whenever the system's
logical seals are removed or containers are opened. The concept is that every access will
cause a different random number to be displayed. Tampering can then be detected by
comparing the current number with its value prior to shipping. The main weakness of this
approach is that an adversary can simply remove the device and replace it with a similar
one that displays the original number. The false device may even continue to generate
random numbers with successive triggers to avoid drawing suspicion to itself. TDS
provides a cost-effective, reusable seal that cannot be forged, bypassed, or replaced. In fact,
even if an authorized person accesses the equipment, he/she will not be able to do so
without leaving evidence. TTiis system consists of a display module, an array of tamper
sensors, a random number generator, an audit counter and a physical key. When any sensor
is activated, the display module generates a random number, referred to as the audit
counter. The audit counter is then encrypted and stored, and a sequence number is
incremented. To later recover this information, a trusted individual inserts a Datakey
[Datakey is a trademark of Datakey, Inc., Burnsville, MN] containing the corresponding
decrypt key. The decrypt key is extracted, and the encrypted audit counter is decrypted and
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displayed along with the sequence number. Verification that the sequence number and audit
counter have not changed since they were last examined provides assurance that access had
not been gained. The combined operations of generating a random number each time access
takes place and limiting its recovery only to authorized personnel in possession of a
uniquely keyed and physically separate device, results in an unforgeable seal. This provides
its users with a very high level of confidence that the enclosure's integrity has not been
breached. This is the first example where it is explicitly stated that the security relies on
tamper resistance. It achieves this by using tamper-resistant devices and by storing all
devices that holds the secret key in physically secure locations. [Ref. 33]
7. Resolution of Disputes
A digital signature with the generator's identification and timing data (like,
timestamp) can retain evidence of the original message. It, therefore, finds an application
if a dispute arises between the sender and receiver over a message. The digital signature
may be presented as evidence to a referee, who can then settle the dispute. Signatures also
find application where the sender and receiver are not in dispute, but the receiver may wish
to save the message and use it at a later date with the assurance that it has not been modified
in the interim.
8. A Secure Telephone system
Diffie describes a secure telephone system for use with Integrated Services
Digital Network (ISDN) which relies on digital signatures. To make a secure telephone
call, a user places a smart card in the telephone and dials the required number. When the
receiving telephone answers, the two telephones perform a Diffe-Hellman exponential key
exchange. This exchange provides the telephone with a shared key which is a combination
of secret pieces of information chosen at random by the two telephones.
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9. Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
This standard specifies a Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) appropriate for
applications requiring a digital rather than a written signature. The DSA is a pair of large
numbers represented in a computer as strings of binary digits. The DS is a computing
algorithm using a set of rules and a set of parameters enabling it to be used to verify the
identity of the originator and the integrity of the data.
The DSA includes signature generation and verification. Generation makes use of
a private key to generate a DS. Verification of the signature makes use of a public key that
corresponds to, but is not the same as, the private key used to generate the signature. Each
user possesses a private and public key pair. Public keys are assumed to be known to all
members of a group of users (or to the public in general). Private keys must be known only
by their creators. Anyone can verify the signature of a user by employing that user's public
key. Signature generation may be performed only by the possessor of the user's private key.
A hash function is used in the signature generation process to obtain a condensed
version of data, that is, a message digest. The message digest is then signed. The DS is sent
to the intended recipient along with the signed data (often called a message). The recipient
of the message and signature verifies the signature by using the sender's public key. The
same hash function must also be used in the verification process. The hash function will be
specified in a separate standard. Similar procedures may be used to generate and verify
signatures for stored as well as transmitted data.
The DSA authenticates the integrity of the signed data and the identity of the
signer. The DSA may also be used in proving to a third party that data was actually signed
by the generator of the signature. The DSA is intended for use in E-mail, EFT, EDI.
software distribution, data storage, and other applications which require data integrity
assurance and data origin authentication. [Ref 34]
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10. Privacy Enhancement Mall (PEM)
TTie privacy enhancement for Internet E-mail proposed in the Network Working
Group RFC 1421, RFC 1422, RFC 1423, and RFC 1424 is stated for use with security
services. These security services include the algorithms of message encryption, message
integrity check, symmetric key management, asymmetric key management, asymmetric
encryption, and asymmetric signature. It is designed to be compatible with current Internet
E-mail formats. It is an inclusive standard, and allows the use of both public-key and secret-
key cryptosystems. Multiple cryptographic tools are supported; for each mail message, the
specific hash function, encryption algorithm, signature algorithm, etc., are specified in the
message header. PEM also supports the use of certificates, endorsing CCITT X.509 for
certificate structure.
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IV. SECURITY PROBLEMS OF ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE
This chapter classifies the following threats and vulnerabilities associated with EDI:
1. application program (data security), 2. platform (network security), 3. security
management, and 4. interchange security. The relationship between these aspects and the
DS will be discussed as well. The next chapter will discuss the details of security
management.
A. INTRODUCTION
The international standard ISO 7498 part 2 (Basic Reference Model for Open System
Interconnect: Security Architecture) suggests that the term "security" means minimizing
the vulnerabilities of assets and resources. A threat can be any person, object, event, or idea
that, if realized, could potentially cause damage to the EDI system. Threats can be
malicious, such as the intentional modification of sensitive EDI documents, or can be
accidental, such as the EDI format entry error of the operator. Vulnerabihties are
weaknesses in an EDI system that may be exploited by a threat.
A security service is the collection of security mechanisms, procedures, etc., that are
implemented on an EDI system to protect the EDI from threats. For instance, the
identification and authentication service could be designed to help protect the EDI system
from unauthorized EDI access by requiring that senders or recipients identify themselves
through digital signatures. Security mechanisms are the controls implemented to provide
the security services that are needed to protect the EDI system. For example, a token based
authentication system (which requires that the user be in possession of a required token)
may be the mechanism implemented to provide the authentication and identification
service.
This chapter assesses the possible threats and vulnerabilities of EDI, and presents the
required security services and mechanisms. Proper security tools for implementing EDI
documents transmission will also be discussed. The only current practical method of
protection for EDI documents transmission is through the use cryptographic techniques,
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which have been implemented as interchange security tools. The interchange security of
EDI documents transmission is discussed at the end of this chapter. The managerial security
issues will be discussed in Chapter V.
B. THREATS ASSESSMENT OF EDI
This section reviews the eight major threats to EDI in an EDI environment. The
primary vulnerabilities are related to those threats and will be discussed in the next section.
The threats may occur in EDI systems, network system and message handling system
including unauthorized access, inter-document threats, and in addition. Attacks on open
system platform of EDI will address potential weakness and may comprise a number of
threats.
1. Unauthorized Access
Unauthorized user access into an EDI system is a primary security threat. The
system is vulnerable if it lacks identification and authentication facilities such as an access
control list or access control matrix, password management or Trojan horse/back door
avoidance programs. Sometimes, problems are caused by an unprotected modem, lack of
entrance control facilities in the computer center, etc. Prevention of unauthorized access
will greatly reduce the threats to EDI.
2. Inter-document Threats
TTie inter-document threats are also called message sequencing threats. This type
of threat occurs when part or all of the message is repeated, time-shifted, or re-ordered to
fool, confuse, or even violate the initial agreement. This can be used to exploit the
authentication information in a valid message and resequence or time-shift valid messages.
Inter-document threats arise from unauthorized agents who are external to the message
communication, and can manifest themselves in the following ways:
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a. Masquerade
A masquerade occurs when an imposter pretends to be an authorized user.
Masquerade threats include the following:
( 1
)
impersonation and misuse of the Message Transfer System (MTS);
(2) false acknowledge receipt;
(3) false claim to originate a message;
(4) impersonation of an Message Transfer Agent (MTA) to an MTS user;
(5) impersonation of an MTA to another MTA.
A masquerade usually consists of other forms of attack and in a secure system
may involve authentication sequences from valid users, e.g., in replay or modification of
messages. [Ref. 35]
b. Traffic Analysis •'
The observation of information between users can reveal to an eavesdropper
how much data is being sent and how often. However, even the eavesdropper cannot
determine the actual contents of the document formats, he can still deduce a certain amount
of information from the rate of traffic flow. Under certain OS I layers, traffic analysis is not
naturally restricted. Under a private VAN, this will be easier to prevent but may not be able
to be eliminated.
c. Documents Manipulation or Modification
The replacement, insertion, deletion or misordering of the content of EDI
documents may occur during transmission by unauthorized agent. The ease of this
occurring is based on the level of cryptographic checksums.
3. Intra-document Threats
Intra-message threats are those performed by the actual message communication
participants themselves, and can manifest themselves in the following ways:
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a. Document Repudiation
This occurs when the sender or receiver denies that they sent or received the
document. It is serious when the documents lack a digital signature or timestamp to prove
who the sender is and when the document was signed. This is also very serious when the
transfer of critical contracts or order forms is being made. Also, it will happen in CCITT
X.435 EDI-MHS when an MTS user may later deny submitting, receiving, or originating a
message.
b. Security Level Violation
If a management domain within EDI employs different security clearance
levels (e.g., public, private, business, confidential, etc.), then, users must be prevented from
sending or receiving any EDI to trading partner that have inadequate security clearance
levels.
4. Denial of Service
Denial of service occurs when someone or something dominates the EDI system
resources and tries to stop or slow down the system or EDI platform performance to achieve
a delay. This may result in a denial of access, a denial of communications, a deliberate
suppression of a message to a particular recipient, or a fabrication of extra traffic. In EDI-
MHS, the MTS can be denied if an MTA fails to operate incorrectly. In addition, an MTS
user may cause the MTS to deny a service to other users by flooding the service with EDI
messages which might overload the switching capability of an MTA or fill up all available
EDI message storage space.
Networks are also vulnerable to denial of service attacks. In attacks of this kind,
an attacker prevents legitimate users from using the network. There are three common types
of the network denial of service attacks: service overloading, message flooding, and signal
grounding. Service overloading occurs when floods of network requests are made to a
server daemon on a single computer. These requests may be initiated in a number of ways,
many intentional. The result of these floods can cause machines to be so busy servicing
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interrupt requests and network packets that it is unable to process local tasks in a timely
fashion. Such attacks may also mask an attack on another machine by preventing audit
records and remote login requests from being processed in a timely manner. Message
flooding occurs when a user slows down the processing of a system on the network to
prevent it from processing its normal workload by "flooding" the machine with network
messages addressed to it. The flood of messages overwhelms the target so that most of its
resources are being used to respond to the messages. In extreme cases, it will block the path
of EDI transmission causing errors or lack of memory.
5. Data Interception or Taps
Data interception means the observation by an unauthorized user of
communication by an authorized user. There are two basic types of taps:
a. Passive Taps
Passive taps threaten the secrecy of the information that is being transmitted.
The intruder of this kind will attack through eavesdropping or monitoring the data but
doesn't modify it.
b. Active Taps
Active taps threaten the authenticity of the information that is being
transmitted. The intruder will threaten the transmission by changing the original document,
misrouting it to another destination, replaying a previous document, or forging an
acknowledgment of a genuine sending. [Ref. 36]
6. Data Store Threats
a. Mis-routing
The unauthorized modification of the directory's contents could lead to
messages being mis-routed or even lost, while unauthorized modification could mislead or
confuse the intended recipient. This problem will naturally occur in Open System
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Interconnection (OSI) layers 1 to 3 when using an open system as EDI platform, but will
be less if using a private VAN.
b. Preplay
An unauthorized agent could make a copy of a deferred delivery document
and send this copy to the intended recipient while the original was still being held for
delivery. TTiis could fool the document recipient into replying to the document originator
before the originator was expecting a reply or could simply mislead or confuse the original
intended document recipient. In an EDI system, these threats will cause dual ordering or
document duplication.
7. Leakage of Information
Information may be acquired by an unauthorized party by monitoring
transmissions, or by unauthorized access to information stored in any data storage entity.
In some cases, the presence of an MTS user on the system may be sensitive and its
anonymity may have to be preserved. An MTS user other than the intended recipient may
obtain a message. This might result from impersonation and misuse of the MTS or by
causing an MTA to operate incorrectly. Further details on the information flowing in an
MTS may be obtained from observing the traffic.
8. Other Threats
In a multi- or single-level secure system, a number of threats may exist that relate
to security labelling, e.g., routing through a node that cannot be trusted with information of
a particular value, or where systems use different labelling policies. Threats may exist to
the enforcement of a security policy based on logical separation using security labels. An
MTS user may originate a message and assign it a label for which it is not cleared. An MTS
user or MTA may set up or accept an association with a security context for which it does
not have clearance.
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C. VULNERABILITIES ASSESSMENT ON EDI
There are many points that vulnerabilities may occur when documents are being
interchanged.
1. Media
Media, including telephone lines, the cabling, microwave, the radio transmission,
and even the optical fiber, may be vulnerable. Different types of media will have different
levels of vulnerability.
2. EDI Application Equipment
EDI application equipment such as the switching systems, signaling equipment,
or testing equipment can be attacked. The access points of an EDI user interface on the
communication lines are very vulnerable to attack. In addition preventing unauthorized
access, one has to be concerned about the communication environment. For instance, the
network itself should be tolerant to natural disasters and data error.
3. Security Management
Security management includes physical/logical security management, such as
EDI system hardware management, EDI system software management, EDI system
operation personnel management, EDI documents flow management, etc. Various
management issues will cause different types of vulnerabilities, and will influence the
organization as a whole.
4. The Weakest Point
It's often easier to break into a system over a network than it is onsite. Using a
telephone or network to transmit EDI makes it easier for a cracker to break in midway.
D. SECURITY MECHANISMS
1. .Authentication Exchange
There are two grades of authentication:
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a. Simple Authentication
This relies on the originator supplying its name and password, which are
checked by the recipient.
b. Strong Authentication
Strong authentication relies on the use of cryptographic techniques to protect
the exchange of validating information. TTiis cryptosystem may be an asymmetric scheme
or a symmetric scheme using a private key system or public key system. The authentication
exchange mechanism is used to support the peer entity authentication service.
2. Encryption
Either symmetric or asymmetric cryptosystems may be used to encrypt data and
generate digital signatures. In the case of EDI transmission, encryption is performed on an
EDI formatted message before initiating interchange and decryption is performed after
receipt. This service supports the data confidentiality and maintains the privacy of
messages.
3. Data Integrity
This mechanism involves the encryption of a compressed string of the relevant
data to be transferred. Together with plain data, this message is sent to the recipient. The
recipient repeats the compression and subsequent encipherment of the plain data and
compares the results with that created by the originator to prove integrity. This mechanism
also involves the generation and verification of integrity checks which exist at the
originating end and at the receiving end, respectively. Integrity mechanisms employ
cryptographic techniques to produce integrity checksums which can be used to determine
whether there has been any insertion, deletion or reordering of documents. This is done by
using chaining techniques. For example, the Message Authentication Code (MAC) may be
generated by the cipher block chaining (CBC) technique. The data integrity mechanism is
combined with encipherment of the compressed plain data by either an asymmetric scheme
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or a symmetric scheme. Both symmetric and asymmetric schemes are provided by the DS
mechanism. The data integrity mechanism supports the data integrity service. It also
partially supports the non-repudiation service and can be fully met by using the DS
mechanism.
4. Non-repudiation
TTie common mechanism for providing non-repudiation relies on the use of digital
signatures. Typically, the digital signature is calculated using the public key algorithm. A
hash function is needed when it is necessary to sign long messages. After generation of this
digital signature, it is attached to the document before being sent out.
5. Digital signature
This mechanism involves the encipherment by the originator's secret key of a
compressed string of the relevant data to be transferred. The digital signature together with
the plain data is sent to the recipient. Similar data integrity mechanisms, this message is
processed by the recipient to prove integrity. The DS mechanism also proves the
authenticity of the originator and the unambiguous relationship between the originator and
the data that was transferred. The DS mechanism supports the data integrity service and
also supports the non-repudiation service.
E. THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY SERVICES
We now consider the security services required to preventing the threats that are
mentioned above:
1. Identification and Authentication
This service provides a mechanism to verify whether the sender and recipients are
who they claim to be. It also provides the confidence that, at the time of request, an entity
is not attempting to masquerade or mount a replay attack. Two types of different peer entity
authentication services follow.
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a. Single Entity A uthentication
In this case, identification and authentication is required by the person who
want to access the system. This service is implemented by the mechanism of userids,
passwords, tokens, etc.
b. Mutual A uthentication
This method allows both the sender and recipient to authenticate each other.
When requesting a peer entity authentication service, the two users agree whether
their identities will be protected or not. In a general situation, when two parties wish to
authenticate each other, they may need to involve one or more third parties. The nature of
trust between each party and the third party is an important issue in determining the
assurance of the service. Examples of third parties include authentication servers, key
management servers and certification authorities. This service may be used to protect
against masquerade and replay.
2. Access Control and Authorization
This service provides the ability to limit and control the access right to host
systems or the platform where EDI application software is located. Also, this service can
protects the EDI information that is stored in the application program or database system.
In an access control scheme, certain entities (initiators) attempt to access other entities
(targets) for the purpose of getting information or modifying data accidentally or
maliciously.
a. Decision Process ofAccess Control
Access control information used in the decision process includes the
following:
- Individual identities of initiators and targets.
- Group identities of initiators and targets.
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- Security labels of initiators (e.g., clearances) and targets (e.g.,
classifications).
- Roles (e.g., system administrator, manager) of initiators and targets.
- The actions or operations that can be allowed to perform on target.
- Other contextual information, which may include time periods, routing
information, and location information.
b. Rules ofSimple Access Control
TTie simple access control rules include:
- Check every access
- Allow least privilege
- Verify acceptable usage
This service is achieved through discretionary access control (DAC) or
mandatory access control (MAC) using the facilities of an access control list, access control
matrix or capability granting. TTie difference between discretionary access control and
mandatory access control is that the former makes the security decision by users and the
latter are driven by the results of a comparison between the user's trust level or clearance
and the sensitivity designation of the information. This service may be used to protect
against the unauthorized use of resources.
3. Data Confidentiality
TTiis service is used to provide for protection of data from unauthorized disclosure
and protects against data interception. The mechanisms that are typically used to provide
confidentiality are based on cryptographic techniques. In an operating system environment,
it may be sufficient to protect the confidentiality of data just by combination with access
control mechanisms. In a network environment, link-to-link or end-to-end encryption can
be provided. Examples include DES - Symmetric encryption, and RSA - pubhc key
encryption. Confidentiality attributes include secret keys, public, and private keys. The
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process of data confidentiality may be initiated after the necessary keys for encipherment
have been exchanged.
4. Data Integrity
This service provides proof of the integrity of data in the communication and can
be used to detect and protect against the manipulation and modification of data.
5. Non-repudiation
This service provides proof of the integrity and origin or delivery of data, in an
unforgeable relationship, which may be verified by any third party at any time. This
protects the sender against the threat of false denial by the recipient and protects the
recipient against the threat of false denial by the sender.
6. Auditing and Accountability
The security audit service is complementary to all the security services described
above in that it is not direcdy involved in the prevention of security violations but assists
in their detection. Security auditing is crucial both within a system and over the network.
The main role of this service is to collect security relevant information from the system
operation, application program facility, and network platforms that are used to test the
adequacy of the security controls. Following an audit analysis, an entity may be held
accountable for its actions so that violations or attempted violations of system security may
be traced uniquely to it. To audit information, this service may use other services such as
authentication, integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation.
7. Availability and Prevention of Denial of Service
Denial of a service is usually regarded as an extreme case of information
modification in which the information transfer is either blocked or drastically delayed. A
measure against such an attack is provided by arranging the periodic exchange of
information between entities to ensure that an open path exists between them. The greater
the frequency of such a request response mechanism, the shorter the time period during
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which the denial of service attack will remain undetected. The disadvantage of this service
is that the effective bandwidth of the network is reduced.
8. Interchange Security
Since the EDI TSs is transmitted on the network, the security of interchange EDI
information is more important than the security of the data itself. The purpose of
interchange security is to protect the confidentiality of the message, to verify the originator
of the message, and to verify the integrity of the message. These interchange security
services include encryption, authentication, response messages, and key management.
Features of the public key cryptosystem are the prevention of attack by hard to
solve problems (i.e., one-way function, or large number computing), and the separation of
public key and secret key. In practice, most attacks on public key cryptosystems will
probably be aimed at the key management levels (e.g., storage of the secret key, publication
of the public key, distribution of the secret key, etc.), rather than at the cryptographic
algorithm itself. In general, key management includes key generation, key distribution, key
validation, and key storage, etc. We will discuss some key management systems covered
by the EDI-related security standards. Other related discussions on key management issues
may be found in PEM, RSA, PKCS and DSS.
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V. SECURITY MANAGEMENT OF ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE
A. INTRODUCTION
Security management of EDI and DS was discussed in Chapter II and HI. Chapter IV
discussed the technical aspects of vulnerabilities, threats and required security mechanisms
for preventing attacks. In this chapter, we discuss the managerial aspects, such as the
internal controls of the EDI environment, auditing, security of EDI platforms, personnel
security, etc.
Does a digital signature provide enough security in an EDI system? What types of
security tools are available when interchanging EDI information? What are the main
security services provided by various security standards? How can the EDI users be best
protected?
The first part of this chapter surveys standards that provide security services and
mechanisms that protect EDI implementations from threats. The main focus here is on
security standards regarding the usage of cryptographic systems for interchange security
for EDI transactions. Additionally, a security management model will be suggested for EDI
system implementation. Questions to address include: What are the security goals of the
organization? What is the security policy? What are the concerns of this model? What are
the business considerations when implementing EDI? All these EDI security management
issues will be discussed.
B. EDI-RELATED SECURITY STANDARDS
1. Introduction
This section surveys the security standards relevant to EDI users. This security
includes the ANSI X.9 series for the financial community, the ANSI X. 12 series for the EDI
community and CCITT X.400, X.500, X.509, etc. for messaging systems. These EDI-
related security standards are complicated and ambiguous, and can be difficult for new EDI
participants to implement. Some security mechanisms recommended by these standards are
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becoming obsolete because of the emergence of new advanced cryptosystem techniques.
The purpose of this section, however, is to survey those security services and mechanisms
work.
2. The Use of ANSI X.9
a. Introduction
In the late 1970s, the financial community realized that the traditional
password systems would neither provide the requisite security nor the transaction
processing growth potential for the future. A working group under the Financial Services
Committee of ANSI developed a message authentication standard which is coded X9,
which represented a step toward solving these problems.
Because the public key algorithm was not yet available at that time, standards,
like ANSI X9.9-1982, Financial Institution Message Authentication (Wholesale), utilized
the Data Encryption Algorithm and secret key. A cryptographically derived checksums
called a Message Authentication Code (MAC) was computed from the financial message
ANSI XI 2.58 EDI Security Structure standard, which uses ANSI X9.23 (Encryption of
Wholesale Financial message) as a security model. The X9.23 has a number of modes of
operation for encryption which are selected by a user prior to use.
b. ANSI X9.9: Message Authentication Standard
ANSI X9.9 defines a method for authenticating the integrity of a message. It
is used by a message receiver to verify the identity of the data originator and to detect
modifications of the data in the message. Also, ANSI X9.9 provides different
authentication options:
( 1 ) Binary Data. The MAC is applied to the entire body of the message,
regardless of the coding of the data in the message. For example, coding may consist of
EBCDIC or ASCD characters, or of machine code. Although a unique message identifier
is not mandated by the standard for this option, it is highly recommended in order to
provide for the detection of message replay and deletion.
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(2) Coded Characters. Coded characters include the entire message and
extracted message elements. All characters to be authenticated are represented by eight-bit
ASCII characters. If the message is transformed into a different character set after MAC
computation by the message originator (i.e., before or during transmission), the inverse
transformation must be applied before the receiver begins the authentication process. The
date of message origination and a message identifier must be present in messages
authenticated using these options and are included in the list of elements that are submitted
to the authentication algorithm.
(3) Field Delimiters. A delimiter is a group of characters used to identify the
beginning and end of one or more data fields or message elements. These are required for
the coded character set options so that the application can determine the message elements
to be authenticated. Beginning and ending delimiters must occur in complementary pairs
without intervening delimiters. Information may occur in the message outside a
complementary pair of delimiters. This information will not be authenticated when a coded
character set authentication option is selected. Explicit delimiters are specific strings of one
or more characters which are used to demarcate message elements. ANSI X9.9 identifies
explicit delimiters for the date of message origination, the identity of the message
authentication key, the MAC, the message identifier and all other message elements.
Implicit delimiters may be used if the position of a message element is fixed or
unambiguously identified in a message by format rules. Both the originator and the
recipient must have previously agreed to their use. Note that the format rules could consist
of the definition of explicit delimiters other than those defined in ANSI X9.9.
c. ANSI X9.17: Key Management Standard
(1) General Key Management Requirements. The ANSI X9.17 Financial
Institution Key Management (for wholesale) Standard describes a standard level of
protection to assure the security of keying material. This includes cryptographic keys and
other related information needed to manage the keys and the Key Management Facility
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(KMF), the physical enclosure containing the cryptographic elements. The minimum
requirements specified by the standard include:
- Control of keying material during the entire life of the keys. The key must
be randomly generated and exists until the key is expired or compromised (should be
expired at that time). Keys must either be physically secured or encrypted to protect keys
from unintended or unauthorized disclosure. When physical protection is not possible,
keying material may be cryptographically authenticated in conjunction with a counter.
- Secure distribution of keys to permit interoperability between
communicating parties and their various cryptographic equipment or facilities. To support
the varying needs of financial institutions and to permit interoperability, the standard
defines both manual and automated methods for the exchange of cryptographic keys.
- Ensuring integrity of keys and the KMF. Overall key management must be
put in place with the proper procedural controls. Tlie keys, KMF, and procedural controls
must be continually tested and monitored to ensure that the entire key management process
is secure.
- Recovery in the event of failure, that is, ability to maintain a defined level
of protection when the integrity of a key of the key management process is compromised.
(2) Automated Key management architecture. The ANSI X9.17 standard is
based on a hierarchically structured set of cryptographic keys designed for automated
distribution of keys over a computer network. Three distinct classes of keys form the
hierarchy:
- Manually distributed key encrypting keys (KKMs). KKMs may be single
key pairs or may encrypt other keys for distribution. Since key encrypting keys typically
have longer cryptoperiods than data keys, key pairs may be used for increased protection.
The KKMs form the basis for a keying relationship between two communicating parties.
- Automatically distributed key encrypting keys (KKs). In order to
automatically exchange keys over a computer network, both parties must share a single
KKM or set up a KKM pair with a trusted third party or key center.
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- Automatically distributed data keys (KDs). Single KDs may authenticate
messages used to distribute keys and encrypt or authenticate data. Once the KKM is shared
between two parties or a common key center, additional keys may be encrypted for
automatic distribution over a computer network. At a minimum, the standard requires a
two-layer architecture in which KKMs encrypt KDs for distribution. An optional three-
layer architecture may be used in which KKMs encrypt KKs for distribution and KKs
encrypt KDs for distribution. In both cases, initialization vectors (IVs) are used to destroy
any residual pattern contained in the encryption data. In some cases, the same IV must be
used for decryption at the receiving site as at the transmitting site to allow the decryption
to be successful. Therefore, synchronization of the IV's is required. If the FVs are
encrypted, they must be encrypted by KDs.
(3) Key Generation. The methods used to generate new keys and IVs must
be secure. If the methods involve manual procedures, then they must be protected as under
dual control. Automated procedures must be physically and logically protected. New key's
and IVs must be generated so that they are random. Any one of the possible keys or IVs
must be equally likely to be generated. Each key or IV generated must have no apparent
relationship to its predecessors or successors. The protection provided in the key generation
process must be at least as great as that required for the data, so that the cryptographic
protection obtained by encryption and authentication with the generated keys is not
compromised by the key generation process.
(4) Key andIV Encryption and Decryption. The standard recommends using
the ANSI DEA to encrypt and decrypt keys and IVs for automated distribution. Single
KKMs and KKs encrypt and decrypt other single keys using DEA in the Electronic Code
Book (ECB) mode. Single keys may not be used to encrypt and decrypt key pairs. KKMs
or KKs may be used to encrypt and decrypt single keys and other key pairs using DEA in
the ECB mode to perform multiple encryption. To perform multiple encryption of a key
with a key pair, the key is encrypted by the first key in the key pair, the result is then
encrypted by the second key in the key pair, and finally the second result is encrypted again
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by the first key in the key pair. Even if a KMF is designed to use key pairs, encryption may
be performed by a single key using the same key as both the first and second keys of a key
pair. If IVs are encrypted, then KDs encrypt and decrypt the IVs using DEA in the ECB
mode.
(5) Key Counters and Key Offsetting. The standard requires the use of key
counters to control the automated distribution of encrypted keys. By counting the messages
transmitted over a computer network distributing encrypted keys, the replay of previously
transmitted messages may be detected and messages received out of sequence may be
recognized. When two communicating parties exchange keys directly between themselves,
two separate counters (a transmit count and a receive count) must be maintain by both
parties. The counters are kept with KKM or KK used to encrypt keys for distribution. Under
normal conditions, the originating party's transmit count should equal the receiving party's
receive count for the message to be accepted. The standard requires that all keys encrypted
for distribution must be protected by key offsetting. Key offsetting simply combines the
transmit count with the KKM before it encrypts other keys for distribution. The encrypted
key must be encrypted with the same count. This prevents previously distributed encrypted
keys, whose content may have been disclosed for some reason, from being retransmitted.
The encrypted key must be transmitted with a new count but can only be decrypted using
the original count.
(6) Key Notarization. Another protective cryptographic feature of the
standard is the support of key notarization. Key notarization is similar to the action of a
notary public who first requires a customer to be identified before the customer's signature
is notarized on a document. In automated key distribution, electronic notarization seals
encrypt keys with the identities of the originator and the intended recipient. A notary seal
is formed by combining the KKM or KK to be used with the identities of the two parties.
This notary seal is then offset by the counter associated with the KKM or KK to form a
notarizing key to encrypt keys for distribution. Once keys are sealed or notarized, they may
only be decrypted by the same notarizing key. The standard requires that all keys generated
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by a key center for use by two particular parties be notarized with the identities of those
parties. Security is increased as the notarized keys cannot be decrypted and used by any
other parties. In an EDI environment, all keys sent in cryptographic service message (CSM)
TSs shall be notarized. Notarization as defmed in Section 7 of ANSI X9.17 is interpreted
(for EDI) to graphically combine the Security Originator Name and the Security Recipient
Name as they appear in the header of a CSM. This guarantees that the key is the one
designated for use by the two named parties.
(7) Automated Key Distribution Protocols.
- CSM and authentication. CSMs are exchanged between two
communicating parties to establish new keys and to discontinue existing keys. These fixed-
format messages (transmitted in plaintext) may carry encrypted keys, IVs, and other keying
material, such as the identities of the two parties, the identities of the keys, and the counts.
To guarantee the integrity of a CSM when it is transmitted over a computer network, its
originator must authenticate the entire contents of the message in accordance with the
ANSI X9.9 Message Authentication Standard. The results of MAC in the CSM must be
included so it can be verified by the recipient. Certain CSMs must be authenticated with the
KDs being established or discontinued. Since these KDs will be encrypted with a KKM or
KK shared only between the actual originator and the recipient of the KDs. the identity of
the actual originator of the CSM may then be verified by its recipient.
- Point-to-point environment. A point-to-point environment exists when two
parties share a KKM or KK pair so that further key encrypting keys and KDs may be
exchanged. At least one of the parties must have the capability to generate or otherwise
acquire keys. The implementation of the point-to-point environment is the minimum
required for automated key distribution and will not be efficient for systems of greater than
20 partners.
- Key center environment. Key center environment includes the key
distribution center (KDC) environment and the key translation center (KTC) environment.
A KDC exists for the purpose of distributing generated or acquired KDs to two parties who
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wish to communicate with each other but do not currently share keys. Each may share a
KKM or KK pair with the KDC but may not have the ability to generate keys. One party
may request KD from the KDC for later communication to another party. The KDC
generates or acquires the KDs and sends two identical sets to the originator using a KKM
or KK pair shared with the originator to key offset and encrypt one set of keys, and a KKM
or KK pair shared with the recipient to key offset and encrypt the other set of keys. The
originator then sends the second set to the recipient.
A KTC is used to translate keys for future communication between parties
who have the similar situation with a KDC. KKMs or KKs and KDs may be translated and
exchanged, but only one of the two types is actually processed by the center at one time. A
key to be used for future communication with the other party is sent to the KTC, encrypted
under the offset key encrypting key pair shared between the originator and the KTC. The
KTC decrypts this key, reencrypts using notarization and sends the reencrypted version
back to the originator. The originator then sends the reencypted version to the recipient.
d. ANSI X9.23: Encryption of Financial Messages
ANSI X9.23 defines a method for the encryption and decryption of the entire
message to provide confidentiality (privacy) of the data in the message.This standard also
includes several filtering algorithms.
i\) Mode ofOperation. Several modes of encryption have been identified for
encryption using the DES algorithm. The modes of operation used by implementation of
ANSI X9.23 are:
- Cipher Block Chaining (CBC). The CBC encryption mode is used to
encrypt 64-bit blocks of information. Successive ciphertext and plaintext blocks are
chained together until the last plaintext block is encrypted. A 64-bit FV is used during the
encryption of each message in the CBC mode. If a new IV is not provided for each message,
then a new 64-bit Initial Text Sequence (ITS) must immediately precede the message data
to be encrypted. If the data to be encrypted does not consist of an even multiple of 64 bits,
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then the final block is padded with additional bits before encryption. The resulting
ciphertext which includes the encrypted padding bits is sent to the receiver. After
decryption by the receiver, the padding bits are discarded. The padding may consist of
either bits or octets (group of 8-bits). If the logical content of the data to be encrypted is in
8-bit units (e.g., ASCII or EBCDIC characters), octets should be used for padding. The
CBC mode of encryption is desirable when more than a minimal amount of data is to be
processed or an immediate reaction to each character is not required (e.g.. during an
interactive session). The addition of a few bits of padding are insignificant when compared
to the advantage gained by encrypting 64-bits at a time.
- 1-Bit Cipher Feedback (CFB-1). The CFB-1 mode is used to encrypt 1 bit
of plaintext information at a time. 64 bits of output are obtained from the encryption
process; one bit is combined with the plaintext bit, and the other 63 bits of output are
discarded. A new IV is used for each message to be encrypted. CFB- 1 is, therefore, the most
inefficient mode of encryption, but can be useful in an interactive session when the receiver
needs to react immediately to bit patterns other than multiples of 8 or 64 bits.
- 8-Bit Feedback (CFB-8). The CFB-8 mode is used to encrypt 8 bits of
plaintext information at a time. 64 bits of output are obtained from the encryption process;
eight bits of the output are combined with eight bits of plaintext, and the remaining 56 bits
are discarded. A new IV is used for each message to be encrypted. CFB-8 is less efficient
than CBC for the encryption of more than minimal amount of data. If an interactive session
is in progress, CFB-8 allows the receiver to respond to each 8-bit group as it is received and
is encrypted.
(2) Encryption and decryption of entire messages and parts ofmessages:
- Entire messages. When an entire message is to be encrypted (the IV and
ITS) the message including the MAC and the padding field will be encrypted as a unit.
Following encryption, the resulting ciphertext may be filtered, as discussed below. The
receiver"defiliters the receiver message and encrypts the ciphertext as a unit. The encryption
of an entire message is required to maintain confidentiahty between the originator and the
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receiver. Historically, cases exist that show that much information can be derived from
mere bits and pieces of information.
- Parts of messages. Plaintext encryption elements are those part of a plaintext
message to be encrypted. After encryption, the resulting ciphertext may be filtered for
transmission. TTiis filtering nature may be used in non-transparent networks for the reason
of control. The receiver defiliters the message prior to decrypting the ciphertext. The
encryption of plaintext encryption elements will allow the encryption of parts of a message
using different keys, e.g., the encryption of portions of a message by different people with
different responsibilities. The encryption of plaintext encryption does not afford the same
level of security as entire message encryption.
(3) Methodsfor Encryption. Three methods for encryption of these elements
within a message and of the resulting ciphertext encryption elements are permitted by this
standard:
- Plaintext encryption elements are independently encrypted into ciphertext
encryption elements. Each ciphertext encryption element is placed in the message in the
location of the original plaintext encryption element. Ciphertext encryption elements may
be longer than their cortesponding plaintext encryption elements due to the addition of
padding prior to encryption or due to the use of a filtering mechanism. TTie receiver
independently decrypts each received ciphertext encryption element, obtaining the original
encryption element.
- Plaintext encryption elements are extracted from the message, concatenated
and encrypted as a single string. The ciphertext string may be longer than the plaintext
string due to the addition of padding prior to encryption or to the use of a filtering
mechanism. It is quite possible that the number of additional bits could be fewer than those
required if plaintext encryption was used. The message originator then transmits the
resulting message. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext string and inserts the plaintext
encryption elements into the message text. This requires that the plaintext string contain
some identification of the location of the plaintext encryption elements in that string.
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- Plaintext encryption elements are extracted from the message, concatenated
and encrypted as a single data string. The resulting ciphertext string is divided into
ciphertext substrings which are inserted in place of the plaintext encryption elements in the
message. Each bit of the plaintext encryption element is replaced by a single ciphertext bit,
selected in sequence, except for the last encryption element which contains all the
remaining ciphertext bits. This last element may be longer than the original plaintext
encryption element due to the addition of padding prior to encryption or the use of a
filtering mechanism. The receiver concatenates the ciphertext substrings and decrypts the
result as a single ciphertext string. The resulting plaintext encryption elements are inserted
into the message text.
(4) Filtering. ANSI X9.23 identifies the following filtering techniques for
encrypted data prior to transmission:
- No Filtering. This may be used when the communication system is not
sensitive to control characters or strings, or if a process later on is responsible for message
filtering.
- Hexadecimal Filtering. Hexadecimal filtering is accomplished by
converting every four bits of ciphertext into one of 16 characters (from to 9 and A to F)
accepted by the communication system. This technique might be used when
communicating within a network which automatically converts lower case letters to
uppercase or is sensitive to lower case letters and punctuation characters. Since ASCII
characters are represented as eight binary bits, this results in an expansion of 100% (i.e., an
eight bit ASCII character replaces four bits of ciphertext).
- ASCII Filtering. This technique is useful in communications systems in
which all non-blank, non-hyphen, printable characters are acceptable. A simple table is
used for the conversion from ciphertext bits to characters which are to be transmitted. If the
ciphertext was produced by the CFB-1 or CFB-8 modes of encryption, a padding of 4 to 16
bits is added to the ciphertext during the filtering process. If the CBC encryption mode was
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used, the padding will consist of 0-13 bits. When eight bit ASCII characters are transmitted,
this filtering technique results in an average expansion factor of 23%.
- BAUDOT or ASCU/BAUDOT Filtering. This technique might be used in
networks using BAUDOT. The ciphertext is mapped into 20 letters which can be
represented as either ASCD or BAUDOT characters. If the ciphertext was produced by the
CFB- 1 or CFB-8 modes of encryption, a padding of 4 to 16 bits is added to the ciphertext
during the filtering process. If the CBC encryption mode was used, the padding will consist
of 0-13 bits. When five bit BAUDOT characters are used, the average expansion factor is
16%. When eight bit ASCII characters are used, the average expansion factor is 86%.
- User-defined Filtering. This type of filtering is defined by a bilateral
agreement between the originator and the receiver.
3. Security Structure in ANSI ASC X12
a. Introduction
This standard series defines the data formats required for authentication and
encryption that provide integrity, confidentiality, and verification of the security originator
to the security recipient for two levels of exchange of EDI. The two levels are the functional
group (FG) level and the transaction set (TS) level. A TS includes a header control segment,
one or more data segments, and a trailer control segment. The TS may also include a
transaction security header control segment and transaction security trailer control segment
when it is desirable to send the data within the transaction envelope in an authenticated
form. The data element in the TS header identifies the type of TS. A FG contains one or
more related TSs preceded by FG header control segment, and terminated by a FG trailer
control segment. The FG may also include a functional security header control segment and
a functional security trailer control segment when it is desirable to send the data in an
authenticated form. Related security management standards are defined in ANSI XI 2.
ANSI XI 2.6 shows the application control structure, whereas ANSI XI 2.58 discusses the
security structure of EDI. XI 2.42 is used to encrypt the distribution of the keying material
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to data security entities based on the ANSI X9. 17 process with encoding according to EDI
syntax rules. The security issues of these three standards are discussed below.
b. ANSI XI2.6: EDI Application Control Structure
This standard defines the structure of business transactions for computer-to-
computer interchange. This structure is expressed using a symboUc representation of ANSI
X12 data independent of the physical representation (e.g., character set encoding). The
symbolic representation is expressed in terms of both the design and use of X12 structures.
This includes the control segments used to bound loops of data segments together, such as
TSs and groups of related TSs. The special control segments used to bound TSs and groups
of TSs for security purposes are also presented.
( 1 ) Two Levels ofEDI Interchange Data Formats.
- Transaction set (TS). The TS is the basic unit of information exchanged
between trading partners. The TS shall consist of a TS header segment, an optional
transaction security header segment, one or more data segments in a specific order, a
transaction security trailer segment whenever the security header segment is present, and a
TS trailer segment. The TS may also include a transaction security header control segment
and transaction security trailer control segment when it is desirable to send the data within
the transaction envelope in an authenticated or encrypted form, or both. Encryption and
authentication are processes that are external to the X12 syntax processor. The overview
syntax of an XI 2.6 secure TS is listed below. A discussion of the syntax notation and rules
is beyond the scope of this thesis. TTie data elements used in the security header and security
trailer segments are defined in the ANSI XI 2.58 security structure. The syntax notation




























<MAC>(09/09 ): : =<fLxed_length_stnng>
- Functional Group (FG). The FG shall consist of a FG header segment, an
optional functional security header segment, one or more similar TSs, a functional security
trailer and a FG trailer segment. The functional identifier (<function_id>) defines the group








<function_secunty_header>::=SlS<security_header><tr> (security header is defined above)
<function_security_traiJer>::=SlE<gsxMACxtr>
(2) Control Segment. A control segment is used for transferring control
information rather than application information. This control segment includes loop control
segments, TS control segments, functional group control segments, and security control
segments. All control segments are used to delineate segment information. TTie relations of
control segments are as follows:
GS-FunctionaJ Group Header, starts a group of related TSs.
SlS-Function Security Header which defines the starting boundary of authenticated
and/or encrypted data within a functional group.
ST-TS Header, starts a TS.
S2S-Transaction Security Header which defines the starting boundary of authenticated
and/or encrypted data within a TS.
LS-Loop Header, starts a bounded loop of data segments but is not part of the loop.
LS-Loop Header, starts an inner, nested, bounded loop.
LE-Loop Trailer, ends an inner, nested, bounded loop.
LE-Loop Trailer, ends a bounded loop of data segments but is not part of the loop.
S2E-Transaction Security Trailer which defines the ending boundary of authenticated
and/or encrypted data within a TS.
SE-Transaction Group Trailer, ends a TS.
S IE-Function Security Trailer which defines the ending boundary of authenticated
and/or encrypted data within a functional group.
GE-Functional group Trailer, ends a group of related TSs.
More than one ST/SE pair (each representing a TS) may be used within one
functional group. Also, more than one LS/LE pair (each representing a bounded loop) may
be used within one TS. All security segments are optional in this standard. [Ref.37]
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c. ANSI XI2.58: EDI Cryptographic Security Structures Standard
EDI transactions may be protected, using authentication, against
unauthorized alteration during interchange or storage. EDI transactions may also be
protected, using encryption, from unauthorized viewing during interchange and storage.
These are complementary and not competing processes. Either or both of these processes
may be used simultaneously to protect EDI transactions being transmitted from computer
to computer or stored within a computer system. EDI transactions may be protected at the
functional group or TS levels of an EDI interchange or both. A single TS may be
authenticated and encrypted and an includeed functional group may also be authenticated
and encrypted. Accordingly, it is possible to have portions of a single interchange
authenticated and encrypted at various levels for different business purposes. The ANSI
XI 2.58 standard allows for authentication alone, for authentication and encryption, and for
encryption alone. The purpose of this standard is to define the data formats required for
authentication and encryption that provide integrity, confidentiality, and verification of the
security originator to the security recipient for two levels of exchange of EDI formatted
data (the EG level and the TS level). This standard defines data formate for authentication
and encryption of EDI encoded data. The business requirements address in this standard
encompasses:
- Verification of the security originator of a message to the security recipient.
- Verification of data integrity.
- Confidentiality of business data.
- Detection of replay, insertion, modification, deletion, or impersonation.
(l) ANSIX12 Security Segment Specifications. The sequences of both the EG
and TS levels of segments are illustrated in the introduction of ANSI X 1 2.6. The principles
of the standard structure are established as implemented at the various levels. The security
header (SxS, x=l or 2) and trailer (SxE) segments are defined for the two levels using
identical formats, differing only in the naming of the segments and the reference
designators. The same key shall not used for more than one function (e.g., authentication
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and encryption) at any one level, and a key used to provide protection at one level shall not
intentionally be used at another level for the same or a different purpose. When used, the
security header segment is placed immediately following the first segment of the
authenticated group of segments. The security header segment identifies the security
services, authentication, and the encryption keys to be used. TTie security trailer segment
ends the authentication and encryption processes initiated at the corresponding security
header segment. SxEOl is the MAC generated by applying the authentication algorithm
against the designated segments. The format of the SxS and SxE segment is shown in
Figure 1 and 2.
The preparation of the X12 text and formatting of security elements consist
of:
- Designating the segments applicable for authentication or encryption.
- Inserting the SxS segment after the first segment and the SxE segment
before the last segment of those designated.
- Setting the Security Type (SxSOl) to reflect the combination of
authentication or encryption to be used and the algorithm to be employed.
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Figure 1. ANSI X12 Security Header Segment (SxS)
- Filling in the Security Originator Name (SxS02) and Security Recipient
Name (SxS03) appropriate to the business partners of the transaction(s) being processed.
- If authentication is being used, the Authentication Key Name (SxS04) and
Authentication Service Code (SxS05) is inserted; if authentication is not being used, these
optional fields are set to empty (i.e., length zero) and the MAC code (SxEO 1 ) is set as blank
for the minimum field length.
- If encryption is being used, the Encryption Key Name (SxS06), Encryption
Service Code (SxS07), and IV (SxS09), and the Length of Data (SxS08) fields are set to
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empty; if encryption is not being used, all four data elements and their preceding data
element separators are omitted according to ANSI X12 coding conventions.









Figure 2. ANSI X12 Security Trailer Segment (SxE)
(2) The Authentication Process in ANSI X.12.58. Authentication is a
technique used to verify the identity of the originator of a message to the recipient in order
to detect spoofing or impersonation. The integrity of the message is verified by detecting
changes (modifications) in a message (including transmission errors) introduced between
the security originator and the security recipient. A unique message identifier is used to
detect attempts at insertion, deletion, or replay of messages. The ANSI X9.9 standards
employs ANSI X3.92 to compute a Message Authentication Code (MAC). The MAC is a
cryptographic derived hash code used to verify the originator to the recipient and to protect
the integrity of the applicable data. The MAC protects the data whether the data is numeric,
text, or punctuation. The key used to perform the authentication should be known only to
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these two parties (or their authentication authority), and the message must not be modified
after the authentication process is performed by the originator. Authentication does not
modify the text input in the process. It adds a nine-character code to the message that is
expressed in the same character set as the message. TTie authenticated message can then
pass through any communications equipment with the ability to handle an unauthenticated
message. The receiving process must be able to reconstruct the original message from the
data delivered. Basic requirements for a secured business interchange include the need to
detect attempts at insertion, deletion, and replay of messages. These requirements may be
satisfied by having the originating application place a combination of date and message
identifiers (such as a purchase order number) (according to the requirements of ANSI X9.9)
into the authenticated message so that the receiving application can uniquely identify each
message sent. Then the recipient can detect a repeated message from its repeated date and
message identifier. Deleted messages may be detected at origination by the lack of an
authenticated response or at receipt by reconciling the message received against a list sent
separately by the originating application in a separate authenticated message. Inserted
messages may be detected by the receiving application by authentication failure.
Authentication in ANSI XI 2.58 does not protect the confidentiality of the message as
information is interchanged in plaintext form. Message encryption may be used to provide
confidentiality when using authentication to provide integrity protection of the same data.
The scope of the authentication process is defined as follows:
- Authentication begins with the first character of the segment designated for
authentication (i.e., the first character of the segment preceding the "SxS" segment).
- If encryption is also to be performed, the authentication process is
performed through the SxS07 element and then continues with the segment terminator of
the SxS segment (i.e., as if the Length of Data element, the IV element, and their preceding
segment separators were not present).
- Authentication includes and ends with the data element separator preceding
the MAC code.
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(3) The Encryption Process of ANSI XJ2.58. The confidentiality of EDI
encoded data is protected by the prope^ se of encryption. This standard provides a method
for protecting the confidentiality of Xi2 formatted data that is independent of the actual
structure and the data content. Encryption of X12 messages may be performed using ANSI
X9.23. In all cases, the structures defined in this standard apply. Use of the encryption
option of this standard does not provide detection of accidental or deliberate alternation of
messages between the originator and the recipient. Authentication can be used to provide
integrity while using encryption to provide confidentiality of the same data. The scope of
the encryption process is defined as follows.
- Encryption begins with the Initialization Vector field (SxS09).
- Tlie Initialization Vector (IV) is a 64-bit binary value that is encrypted using
Electronic Code Book (ECB). A new IV shall be intentionally reused. Text following the
IV is encrypted using the mode specified in the Encryption Service Code (SxS07).
- Encryption ends with the last character before the segment preceding SxE.
- Filtering is applied to both the encrypted IV and the encrypted data.
- When present, the Length of Data data element counts the number of octets
in the encrypted and filtered and data.
- When the CBC mode of encryption is used, the plaintext data is padded to a
multiple of eight octets by adding text consisting of to 7 ASCII-zeroes followed by a
length value consisting of one ASCII character with value ranging from "1" to "8" that
specifies the number of octets used in the padding. This padding meets the requirements of
ANSI X9.23 and is completely deterministic. Because of the padding, the pre-encrypted
text will always be a multiple of eight octets prior to filtering, and thus fits any 64-bit block-
oriented encryption mode of operation. The padding is added immediately prior to
encryption and is removed by the encryption process. It is not included in the calculation
of the MAC that is computed prior to encryption.
(4) Information Transmitted. The security segments provides space for the
information needed to secure EDI data. The security type and the name of the recipient and
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originator are always present. The autiientication or encryption information is only
included when those options are selected by the type code.
(5) Segment Placement. The placement of the security segments, SIS and
S IE for functional groups and S2S and S2E for TSs, are discussed above. The header is
placed immediately following the group start or TS start segments, and the trailer is placed
immediately preceding the group trailer or TS trailer. Thus, the security segments form an
envelope around the data to be secured and must always be paired (one start segment with
one trailer segment). Note that the security count added to an existing EDI TS will increase
the segment count in the SE segment.
(6) Security Control Segments. The security control segments that are part of
EDI control segment are used to delineate information that is to be encrypted or
authenticated or both. After designating the segments applicable for authentication or
encryption or both (which encompass either a functional group or TS), the SIS or S2S is
inserted after the first designated segment (a functional group header or TS header,
respectively). The SIS and S2S specify a code identifying the security algorithms and
methods that are to be employed for this level of interchange. The SIE and S2E trailer
segments contain a MAC code, is used to verify the integrity of the authenticated segments.
d. ANSI XI2.42 .Cryptographic Service Messages (CSM) Transaction Set
When keying materials are exchanged in an EDI environment, the content of
the key exchange message is generated according to the rules of ANSI X9.17 and the
format of the message is translated into an ANSI ASC X12 CSM Transaction Set
(Transaction Set 815). ANSI XI 2.42 provides for the distribution of keying material to data
security entities based on the ANSI X9.17 process with encoding according to EDI syntax
rules.
ANSI XI 2.42 has defined some of the EDI options from ANSI X9.17 (as
discussed in the previous section):
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(1) The use of key encrypting key pairs rather than single key encrypting
keys.
(2) The use of key notarization in all environments.
(3) IVs are not to be sent in CSMs. They appear, when necessary, in the
headers of TSs and functional groups.
(4) All keys are to be named, and the names are always to be u.sed ANSI
Xy. 1 7 allows the use of unnamed keys if only one key of a type is shared. This procedure
is sometimes unclear if a key name is to appear in a message when the key is named.
4. Security Issue in CCH T X.4(M)
The distributed nature of CCITT X.4()() Message Handling System (MHS) makes
it desirable that mechanisms are available to protect against various security threats that can
arise, in this standard, a security model has been built which includes the procedure for
secure access management and administration, and secure messaging.
a. Secure Access Management and A dministration
The capability of this section covers the establishment of an authenticated
as.sociation between adjacent components and security parameters for the association.
These parameters may be applied to any components in the MHS.
h. Secure Messaging
The capabilities of secure messaging covers the application of security
features to protect messages in the MHS in accordance with a defined security policy. This
includes security services enabling various components to verify the origin of messages
and the integrity oi' the content, and to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the message
content. Also, protect message directly submitted to the message transfer system by a user
agent, message store, or an access unit. They do not cover the application of security
features to protect communication between users and the MHS, or MH u,ser-to-MH user
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communication (a large part of MH user-to-MH user communication is protected between
two UAs).
Many of the secure messaging elements of service provide an originator to
recipient capability and require the use of user agents with security capabilities. They do
not require the use of a message transfer system with security features. For example,
content confidentialities can be applied by enciphering the message content by the
originator, and deciphering by the recipient, with various security parameters transferred
within the message envelope.
Some of the secure messaging elements involve an interaction with the
message transfer system, and require the use of message transfer agents with security
capabilities. Some apply to MS, as well as UAs and MTAs, such as message security
labelling. In general, the MS is transparent to security features that apply between the
originators' and the recipients' UAs. This describes which MHS component is the
"provider" or which is the "user" of the security service. For example, probe origin
authentication is provided by the originating UA, and may be used by the MTAs through
which the probe passes.
c. MHS Security Capabilities
An overview of these capabilities follows [Ref.38]:
( 1
)
Message Origin Authentication. Enable the recipient or any MTA through
which the message passes to authenticate the identity of the originator of a message.
(2) Report Origin Authentication. Allows the originator to authenticate the
origin of a delivery/non-delivery report.
(3) Probe Origin Authentication. Enable any MTA through which the probe
passes to authenticate the origin of the probe.
(4) Proof ofDelivery. Enables the originator of a message to authenticate the
delivered message, its content, and the identity of the recipient(s).
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(5) Proof of Submission. Enables the originator of a message to authenticate
that the message was submitted to the MTS for delivery to the originally specified
recipient(s).
(6) Secure Access Management. Provides for authentication between adjacent
components and the setting up of the security context.
(7) Content Integrity. Enables the recipient to verify that the original content
of a message has not been modified.
(8) Content confidentiality. Prevents the authorized disclosure of the content
of a message to a party other than the intended recipient.
(9) Message flow confidentiality. Allows the originator of a message to
conceal the message flow through MHS.
(10) Message Sequence Integrity. Allows the originator to provide to a
recipient that the sequence of message has been preserved.
(11) Non-repudiation ofOrigin. Provides the recipient(s) with proof of origin
of the message and its content which protects against any attempt by the originator to
falsely deny sending the message or its content.
(12) Non-repudiation of Delivery. Provides the originator with a proof of
delivery message to protect against any attempt by the recipient(s) to falsely deny receiving
the message of its content.
(13) Non-repudiation of Submission. Provides the originator with proof of
submission of the message, which protects against any attempt by the MTS to falsely deny
that the message was submitted for delivery to the originally specified recipient(s).
(14) Message Security Labelling. Provides the capability to categorize a
message, indicating its sensitivity, which determines the handling of a message in
accordance with the security policy.
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5. The Security Model in CCITT X.402
Security features are an optional extension to the MHS that may be used to
minimize the risk of exposure of assets and resources to violations of security threats.
Threats may be countered by the use of physical security, computer security
(COMPUSEC), or security services provided by the MHS. Depending on the perceived
threats, certain MHS security services will be selected in combination with appropriate
physical security and COMPUSEC measures. The security services supported by the MHS
are described below. [Ref. 39]
a. Security Policy
Security services in the MHS must be capable of supporting a wide range of
security policies which extend beyond the confines of the MHS itself. The services selected
and the threats addressed will depend on the individual appUcation and levels of the trust
in parts of the system.
A security policy defines how the risks and exposure of the assets may be
reduced to an acceptable level.
b. Security Services in X.402
Massage transfer security services include:
( 1
)
Origin Authentication Security Service. This security service provides for
the authentication of the identity of communicating peer entities and sources of data. This
service includes: data origin authentication security services that provide corroboration of
the origin of a message, probe, or report to all concerned entities (i.e., MTAs or recipient
MTS-users). These security services cannot protect against duplication of the message.
Proof of submission/delivery security services enables the originator of a message to obtain
corroboration that it has been received/delivered by the MTS for delivery to the originally
specified/intended recipients.
(2) Secure Access Management Security Service. This service is concerned
with providing protection for resources against their unauthorized use. Two components of
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this system are peer entity authentication and the security context security services. The
latter is used to limit the scope of passage of a message between entities by reference to the
message security labels. Therefore, this service is closely related to the message security
labelling security service.
(3) Data ConfidentialiTy Security Services. These security services provide
for the protection of data against unauthorized disclosure. Data confidentiality has been
discussed in Chapter EI, including: connection confidentiality, content confidentiality and
message flow confidentiality.
(4) Data Integrity Security Services. These services are provided to counter
active threats to the MHS. As discussed in Chapter II the features of data integrity are
Connection integrity, content integrity and message sequence integrity.
(5) Non-repudiation Security Services. These services provide irrevocable
proof to a third party after the message has been submitted, sent, or delivered, that the
submission, sending, or receipt did not occur as claimed. For this to function correctly, the
security policy must explicitly cover the message of asymmetric keys for the purpose of
non-repudiation services.
(6) Message Security Labelling Security Service. This security service allows
security labels to be associated with all entities in the MHS, i.e., MTAs and MTS-users. In
conjunction with the security context security services, the implementation of security
policies defines which parts of the MHS may handle messages with specified associated
security labels.
(7) Security Management Service. A number of security management
services are needed by the MHS. The only management services provided in this standard
are concerned with changing credentials and registering MTS-user security labels. The
former service enables one entity in the MHS to change its credentials as held by another
entity in the MHS; the latter service enables the establishment of permissible security labels
for one particular MTS-user.
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6. The security issues covered by CCTTT X.435
This standard is a form of message handling tailored to exchange of EDI
information. The information objects that users exchange in EDI messaging are of two
kinds: EDI messages (EDIM), and EDI notifications (EDIN). The security concerned in
this standard for exchanging EDI is listed below.
a. EDIM
An EDIM is a member of the primary class of information objects conveyed
between users in EDI messaging. An EDIM consists of a Heading and a Body. A Heading
is a set of Heading Fields, each an information item giving a characteristic of the EDIM.
The Body is a sequence of one or more body parts. Information items of several kinds
appear throughout the Heading. The Heading includes the codes of the interchange
recipient/sender, the identification code, the identification code qualifier and the routing
address.
An example of the Heading Fields, according to the need of interchange
security, are listed below. The syntax notation use in this standard is the abstract syntax




edi-application-secunty-elements...( 1 1 JEDIApplicationsecurityElementsField OPTIONAL,
heading-extensions [19] HeadingExtensionsField OPTIONAL )
EDI Application Security Elements field allows an EDI application to
exchange security elements having an end-to-end significance. For example,
EDIApphcationSecurityElementsField ::= SEQUENCE (
edi-application-security -element [0]
EDiApplicationSecurityElement ::=BIT STRING
EDIApplicationSecurityElement ::=SET OF EDIApplicationSecurityExtension
EDIAppiicationSecurityExtension ::= ExtensionField
::}
TTie Body has one primary Body part that contains an EDI information object,
and optionally, its delivery envelope. This body part is either an EDI interchange itself or
a forwarded EDIM. The delivery envelope shall be present if security services are invoked.
b. EDIN
An EDIN is a member of the secondary class of information objects conveyed
between users in EDI messaging. It includes the follows:
- Positive notification report its originator's acceptance of Responsibility of
an EDIM;
- Negative notification reports its originator's refusal to accept responsibility
of an EDEM; and
- Forwarded notification reports that responsibility of an EDIM has been
forwarded together with the subject EDIM.
The security Element field in EDIN, is used to provide "proof/non
repudiation of content received "EDI application security" services.
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SecurityElementField ::= SEQUENCE I
onginaJ-content (0] Content OPTIONAL
onginal-content-integnt\'-check [1) ContentlntegrityCheck OPTIONAL
edi-application-secunty -elements [2) EDIAppUcationSecurityElementsField OPTIONAL
security-extensions [3] SecurityExtensionField OPTIONAL}
SecuntyExtensionField ::= SET OF SecuntyExtensionSubfield
SecurityExtensionsSubField ::= ExtensionField
Security services are available only if the MHS supports secure messaging.
c. Enhanced Security Model
Annex I of CCITT X.435 describes the enhancements required to the security
model defined in CCITT X.402. [Ref.40]
(1) Security Services. The additional security services include: Non-
repudiation/Proof of Reception, Non-repudiation/proof of Retrieval, Non-repudiation/
Proof of Transfer, and Non-repudiation of Content.
(2) Enhancementsfrom CCITT X.402. The Changes to CCITT X.402 include
EDEM Responsibility authentication services and Non-repudiation of EDIM
Responsibility. EDIM Responsibility authentication services include:
- Proof of EDI Notification. This security service enables the originator of a
message to obtain corroboration that his message has been received and that EDIM
Responsibility has been accepted, forwarded, or refused. This service may be provided
using the Content Integrity check on message submission applied to the EDI Notification
of the subject EDEM.
- Proof of Retrieval. This security service enables the MS administrator to
obtain corroboration that a particular message has been retrieved from the EDI Message
Store by the EDI User Agent. Implementation of this security service is a local issue which
is useful between Message Transfer Agents within an Management Domain.
- Proof of Transfer. This security service enables a Message Transfer Agent
or a Management Domain to obtain corroboration that a message has been transferred
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(relayed) to another Message Transfer Agent within another domain. Implementation of
this security service is also a local issue.
Non-repudiation of EDEM Responsibility services include:
- Non-repudiation of EDI Notification. This security service provides the
Originator of a message with irrevocable proof that a message has been received, and that
EDI responsibility has been accepted, forwarded, or refused.
- Non-repudiation of Retrieval. This security service provides the EDI
Message Store administrator and the EDI User Agent with irrevocable proof that a message
has been retrieved from the EDI Message Store by the EDI User Agent. Implementation of
this security service is a local issue.
- Non-repudiation of Transfer. This security service provides a Message
Transfer Agent or a Management Domain with irrevocable proof that a message has been
transferred (relayed) to another MTA within another Domain. Implementation of this
security service is a local issue.
- Non-repudiation of Content. This security service provides an EDI
Messaging user with irrevocable proof of the authenticity and integrity of the content of the
message. This security service may be provided in two ways, using a Notarization
Mechanism or using the Non-repudiation of Origin security service applied to the subject
message and the EDI Notification of the subject message, provided the EDI Notification
includes irrevocable proof of the content of the subject message.
All these security services are available only if the MTS supports secure
messaging. Many of the techniques employed rely on encryption mechanisms. The security
services in the MHS allow for flexibility in the choice of algorithms. The problems with
those standards are that they still use asymmetric encryption systems. The high technology
provides symmetric encryption, as discussed in Chapter D. This technology will become
the solution of next generation security mechanisms.
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7. Security Model in CCTTT X.501: The Directory - Models
a. Authorization Policy
Authorization policy includes the methods of:
(1) Specify Access Rights.
(2) Enforce Access Rights (access control).
(3) Maintain Access Rights.
b. Authentication Policy
Authentication policy includes the methods of:
(1
)
The identity of directory system agents and directory users.
(2) The identity of the origin of received information at the access point.
Actually, CCITT X.501 does not define a security policy, but makes a link to
CCITT X.509 which defines authentication procedures. The Directory Access Protocol
(DAP) and Directory System Protocol (DSP) may provide strong authentication of the
initiator by the signing of the request, data integrity of the request by signing of the request,
and strong authentication of the responder and data integrity of the result by the signing of
the result. The DAP may provide simple authentication between a directory system agent
and a directory user agent. The DSP may provide authentication between two directory
system agents. Administrative authorities of applications making use of the directory may
use their own security policy. The directory supports applications by holding authentication
information (e.g., distinguished names, passwords, certificates) about communication
entities. This is further described in CCITT X.509.
8. CCITT X.509:The Directory - Authentication Framework
a. Simple Authentication
Simple authentication is intended to provide local authorization based upon
a distinguished name of a user, use a bilaterally agreed (optional) password and a bilateral
understanding of this password within a single domain. Utilization of simple authentication
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is primarily intended for local use only, i.e., for peer entity authentication between a
directory user agent and a directory system agent or between a directory system agent and
a directory system agent. Simple authentication may be achieved by several means: ftrst,
the transfer of the user's distinguished name and (optional) password to the recipient for
evaluation. Secondly, the transfer of the user's distinguished name, password, and random
number and/or a timestamp. Finally, the transfer of the protected information described
above together with a random number and/or timestamp. All of these methods are protected
by applying a one-way function. The procedure for achieving simple authentication is as
following:
(1) An originating user A sends its distinguished name and password to a
recipient user B;
(2) B sends the distinguished name and password of A to the directory, where
the password is checked against the user password attribute within the directory entry for A;
(3) The directory confirms (or denies) to B that the credentials are valid;
(4) The success (or failure) of authentication may be conveyed to A.
CCITT X.509 also provides one-way functions and the timestamp for
encryption and to prevent replay. [Ref. 41]
b. Strong A uthentication
As mentioned in Chapter CI, strong authentication is one of two mechanisms
used that relies on the use of cryptographic techniques to protect the exchange of validating
information. There is no mandated cryptosystem in this recommendation.
(1) The approach to strong authentication makes use of the properties of a
family of cryptographic systems, known as PKCS (see Chapter III for details of PKCS,
Public Key Cryptosystems). To achieve interoperability, cryptosystems must support both
sides of the transaction.
Authentication relies on each user possessing a unique distinguished name.
The allocation of distinguished names is the responsibility of the Naming Authorities. Each
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user must trust that the Naming Authorities do not issue duplicate distinguished names.
Each user is identified by secret key. A second u.ser is able to determine if a communication
partner possesses the secret key. This information is used to corroborate that the
communication partner is, in fact, the user. The validity of this corroboration is dependent
upon the secret key remaining confidential. In order for a user to determine that a
communication partner is in possession of another user's secret key, that user must also be
in possession of the second user's public key.
(2) Procedures of Strong Authentication. In general, a specific application
determines the appropriate procedures to meet security policy of the application. There are
three types of strong authentication.
- One-way authentication.
Tliis authentication method involves a single transfer of information from one
user (A) intended for another (B). The following steps are involved:
i. A generates a non-repeating number, used to detect replay attacks and to
prevent forgery.
ii. A sends the following message to B,
B-> A, A{tA, rA, B}
with a timestamp (tA) consisting of a generation time and expiration date.
Alternatively, if data origin authentication of "sgnData" is to be provided by the DS:
B -> A, A{tA, rA, B, sgnData)
In cases, the information is to be conveyed that will subsequently be used as
a secret key (this information is referred to as "encData", and the public key of B is referred
toBp):
B -> A, A, A{tA, rA, B, sgnData, Bp(encData|)
The use of "encData" as a secret key implies that it must be chosen carefully,
e.g., to be a strong key for whatever cryptosystem is used, as indicated in the "sgnData"
field of the token.
iii. B carries out the following actions:
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- obtains a public key of A from B to A, checking that A's certificate has not
expired;
- verifies the signature, and thus the integrity of the signed information;
- checks that B itself is the intended recipient;
- checks that the timestamp is current;
- optionally, checks that rA has not been replayed.
rA is valid until the expiration date indicated by tA, rA is always
accompanied by a sequential part, indicating that A will not repeat the token during the
timestamp tA and therefore that checking of the value of rA itself is not required.
It is reasonable for party B to store the sequential part together with
timestamp tA together with the hashed part of the token during time range tA.
Other than the steps listed above, we need to know that the identity of A and
the authentication token was generated by A; the identity of B, and that the authentication
token actually was intended to be sent to B; and the integrity and "originality" of the
authentication token being transferred.
- Two-way authentication.
TTie following steps are involved:
i. as for one-way authentication step i.
ii. as for one-way authentication step ii.
iii. as for one-way authentication step iii.
iv. B generates rB, a non-repeating number, which is similar to the usage of
rA.
V. B sends the following authentication token to A,
B{tB,rB, A, rA}
with a timestamp (tB) consisting of the same feature data as tA. Alternatively,
if data origin authentication of "sgnData" is to be provided by the DS:
B{tB,rB, A, rA, sgnData}
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In cases where information is to be conveyed that will be subsequently used
as a secret key (this information is referred to as "encData", and the public key of A referred
to" Ap):
B{tB, rB, A, rA, sgnData. ApfencData]}
The use of "encData" as a secret key implies that it must be chosen carefully,
e.g.. to be a strong key for whatever cryptosystem is being used, as indicated in the
"sgnData" field of the token.
vi. A carries out the following actions:
- verifies the signature, and thus the integrity of the signed information;
- checks that A is the intended recipient;
- checks that the timestamp tB is the current one;
- optionally, checks that rB has not been replayed.
- Three-way authentication
The following steps are involved:
i. as for two-way authentication step i.
ii. as for two-way authentication step ii. Timestamp tA may be zero.
iii. as for two-way authentication step iii, except that the timestamp need not
be checked.
iv. as for two-way authentication step iv.
V. as for two-way authentication step v. Timestamp tB may be zero.
vi. as for two-way authentication step vi. except that the timestamp need not
be checked.
vii. A checks that the received rA is identical to the rA which was sent.
viii. A sends the following authentication token to B:
A(rB}
ix. B carries out the following actions:
- checks the signature and thus the integrity of the signed information;
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- checks that the received rB is identical to the rB which was sent by B. [Ref.
42]
c. Threats Protected Against By The Strong Authentication Method
The strong authentication method described in the CCITT X.509 offers
protection against the threats described in Chapter III. In addition, a range of potential
threats are specific to the strong method itself. These are: [Ref. 43]
(1) Compromise of the User's Secret Key. One of the basic principles of the
strong authentication is that the user's secret key remains secure. A number of partial
methods are available for the user to hold his or her secret key in a manner that provides
adequate security. The consequences of the compromise are limited to subversion of
communication involving that user.
(2) Compromise of the CA's Secret Key. That the secret key of a CA remains
secure is also a basic principle of strong authentication. Physical security and "need-to-
know" methods apply. The consequences of the compromise are limited to subversion of
communication involving any user certificate by that CA.
(3) Misleading CA into Producing an Invalid Certificate. The fact that CAs
are off-line affords some protection. It is the responsibility of the CA to check that
credentials are valid before creating a certificate. The consequence of the compromise is
limited to subversion of the communication involving the user for whom the certificate was
created, and anyone impacted by the invalid certificate.
(4) Collusion Between a Rogue CA and User. A collusive attack will defeat
the method. This constitutes a betrayal of the trust placed in the CA. The consequence of a
rogue CA is limited to subversion of communication involving any user certified by that
CA.
(5) Forging of a Certificate. The strong authentication method protects
against forging of a certificate by the CA's signature. This method depends upon the
maintenance of the security of the CA's secret key.
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(6) Forging ofa Token. The strong authentication method protects against the
forging of a token by the sender's signature. This method depends upon maintenance of the
secrecy of the sender's secret key.
(7) Replay of a Token. One- and two- way authentication methods protect
against the replay of a token by the inclusion of a timestamp in the token. The three-way
method does this by checking the random numbers.
(8) Attack on the Cryptographic System. The likelihood of effective
cryptoanalysts of the system is based on advances in computational number theory and
leads to a predicted need for a greater key length.
d. Digital Signature ofCCITT X.509
CCITT X.509 specifies DS for the signed tokens in the directory and is not a
standard for DS in general. The mechanism of the CCITT X.509 digital signature [Ref. 44]
is shown in Figure 3. The D and E block are the mechanism of decryption and encryption,
respectively. The h block is a hash function.
(1) Information is signed by appending an enciphering summary of the
information to it. The summary is produced by means of a one-way function, while the
enciphering is carried out using the secret key of the signer.
(2) The recipient of signed information verifies the DS by:
- applying the one-way hash function to the information;
- comparing the result with that obtained by deciphering the DS using the












Figure 3. The CCITT X.509 Digital Signature
(3) This authentication framework does not mandate a single one-way hash
function for use in signing. It is intended that the framework will be applicable to any
suitable hash function, and will thus support changes to the methods used as a result of
future advances in cryptography, mathematical techniques or computational capabilities.
Two users wishing to authenticate must support the same hash function for the
authentication to be performed correctly. Thus, within the context of a set of related
applications, the choice of a single function will maximize the community of users able to
authenticate and communicate securely. The signed information includes the hashing
algorithm and the encryption algorithm used in computing the DS.
(4) The encipherment of data items described in CCITT X.509 are written by
the ASN.l MACRO for implementation, which include the data type resulting from
applying a DS to the given datatype.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS OF USE DS ON EDI
A variety of security procedures exist that may be implemented to protect against the
threats listed in Chapter IV. Unfortunately, some of these are impractical in a commercial
environment. For example, to protect interchanges from interception, it is possible to use
dedicated private cables or fiber optic cables. Actually, many companies still transmit
information on public telephone line or even microwaves. These are very easy to intercept
without detection. Currendy, the only practical method of protection is the use of
cryptographic techniques.
After analyzing the threats and vulnerabilities of EDI implementation, three of the
security services listed in Chapter FV are relevant to EDI interchange security. These are
encryption, authentication and key management. Chapter III stated that the state-of-art of
digital signatures realizes the security tools needed to allow for secure EDI. The survey
showed that almost all of the security mechanisms used for authentication, encryption, and
key management involve the obsolete conventional private key cryptosystem.
As we learned in Chapter in, digital signatures based on public key cryptosystems
provide authentication for verificadon and encryption for privacy and integrity. Security
standards like ANSI X9 series are still using DES to encrypt messages and keys and FVs
for distribudon. As key management is the natural weakness of private key cryptosystems,
DES cannot provide enough security for the interchange of EDI information. However,
after adopting the public key based DS mechanisms, key distribution will no longer be a
problem in the interchange of EDI information. The ANSI X12 standard series using DES
to generate MAC may be replaced by DS to get rid of the key management weakness
problems to increase interchange security. If the message digest mechanism is combined
with DS, then the problems in message filtering and padding before transmission to the
network will be solved (details were surveyed in Chapter III and IV). It will need a lot of
work to revise the security concept of those standards from the conventional private key
cryptosystem to the modem public key cryptosystem. Futhermore, interchange security
cannot promise the complete security of EDI implementation.
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I
D. SECURITY MANAGEMENT MODEL OF EDI
1. Introduction
The responsibility of management is to safeguard the assets of the organization.
EDFs job is to transmit transactions affecting the assets of all trading partners. When an
organization decides to implement EDI security standards to minimize EDI vulnerabilities
and threats, additional management considerations must be included. Also, when
addressing overall security in an EDI system as a network distributed system, it is necessary
to integrate computer system security with communication security measures to protect the
EDI information. Neither one can provide complete protection of critical EDI information
in a distributed environment without integration. For instance, using an access control
service to restrict users access to an EDI application software within a system or onto a
network provides a higher level of security. Trusted computer system mechanisms are
needed to ensure the enforcement of security controls and that correct operation of the
security measures are maintained. Secure protocol standards are vital to the successful
operation of security measures. Security mechanisms, like encryption algorithms, form an
essential part of the overall solution. Harmonious integration of such security features
forms the key ingredient in the development of an overall secure EDI system.
This security plan of building a EDI security model may be added to the
implementation steps described in Chapter II. The security plan of the organization must be
before the agreement with trading partners is completed.
2. Managerial Characteristics of EDI
The following characteristics of EDI might influence decisions in building the
EDI security management model:
a. There are at least two interconnected trading partners that transmit documents
on the networks. In some cases, there are many interconnected systems or networks
transmitting sensitive and critical EDI documents.
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b. There are many organizations involved in the development and acquisition of
components (big hubs with a huge numbers of spokes).
c. The EDI platform uses a multilevel network. Computers or network nodes
process different levels of classified information while users have different clearances and
need-to-know restrictions.
d. The EDI software packages and EDI platforms are operated by people.
e. There is no overall security policy for EDI implementation. Those
characteristics are the concerns of organizations who want to implement security on an EDI
system.
3. Building EDI Security Management Model
For EDI environments with the characteristics listed above, the management
process may be extremely complicated and resources intensive. A security model for the
organization is built to protect business resources. Before we build a model, a
determination of the EDI environment boundaries, a review of EDI implemented
documents and identification of the overall EDI components should be delineated.
a. Set EDI Security Goals
Setting EDI security goals is not difficult for the organization which is
already involved in EDP. The requirements of physical security, personal security, and data
security are known to them. Adding EDI applications to their processes does not generally
require much change, especially, if they already have telecommunication applications.
Organizations without the experience of computer security need to set their security goals




To provide protection against threats to EDI.
(2) EDI document security must operate at the application level, which means
end-to-end protection.
(3) EDI platforms have to follow the network multi-security levels.
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(4) All security services should be based on existing and proven security
standards.
(5) Do not change the existing EDI structure.
(6) Set the computer security model, if it doesn't have to use an EDP.
b. Determine Security Policy
We will determine the EDI system security policy in at least seven areas:
(1
)
EDI System Security Objectives. Identify primary and secondary security
objectives. The primary objectives may include confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
(2) Roles and Responsibilities. Establish specific duties and tasks for all
personnel with various parts of EDI system. This includes:
- Base level communication-computer security officers, and base computer
security managers
- Network managers, and network security officers
- Computer system managers, and computer system security officers
- EDI software work team managers, and EDI software security officers
- Auditing managers
- Functional Business Managers
- Business managers and technical support from key trading partners
- EDI consultant and vendor security support representatives
(3) Life Cycle Management. Identify life cycle phases for EDI system
implementation additions, deletions, and modifications, and especially for new EDI
systems being developed to interface with their trading partners. Emphasize the need to
continually monitor the EDI system to ensure that security measures remain effective after
system changes.
(4) EDI System Security Measure. In addressing specific policies and
procedures regarding:
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- Physical security, which involves protection and survivability for personnel
and equipment; protection against intentional human threats such as theft, sabotage, and
espionage; and environment security.
- Procedural security, which protects against unintentional human 'threats
such as accidental blunders, improper maintenance, etc.
- Personnel security involves clearance and need- to-know.
- Information security, which includes procedures for handling classified and
sensitive unclassified information; magnetic remains; fraud, waste, and abuse, etc. and
especially, business information, such as the bargaining price of the product or the volume
of the orders.
- Communication security protects secure and sensitive EDI documents
communication.
- Emanations security to prevent exploitation of electronic signal radiations.
- Operations security to identify, control, and protect evidence of the planning
and execution of sensitive activities.
- Trusted systems security, which includes trusted computing base (TCB)
classes, modes of operation, identification and authentication, discretionary and mandatory
access control, object reuse, audit trails, labels, trusted paths, and documentation
requirements.
- Hardware security, which involves nonvolatile strong media, peripheral
security, maintenance activities, periods processing, and firmware.
- Software security, which involves evaluated and non-evaluated products;
user-developed software; public domain software; software development, testing, and
debugging; security software; job control language; configuration management; trusted
software, data base management systems; maintenance activities; and malicious logic.
- Integrity measures such as device identification, message management,
protocols, and integrity checks.
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- Other security considerations such as interface policies and resources
allocation policies.
(5) Contingency and Emergency Plans. Establish criteria for developing and
testing contingency and emergency plans, especially policies for making and storing
backups of the EDI systems and its background database.
(6) Education, Training, and Awareness. Identify policies and procedures for
all aspects of security training, including initial and recurring training for all personnel,
specialized training requirements for personnel in key security positions.
(7) Incident and Vulnerability Reporting. Establish policies and procedures
for identifying and reporting incidents and vulnerabilities. Policy development must focus
on specifically tailoring DoD guidance to the network. The security guide book uses
abstract terms such as subjects, objects, groups of subjects, need-to-know, security labels,
discretionary access controls, and mandatory access controls. The policy should describe
what these abstract terms mean in the context of the EDI implementation procedure. The
policy should address specific issues such as the range of security labels which the network
must accommodate, specific objects having security labels, how security labels are
determined for objects, and the various EDI participants, industries, and actions which are
subject to discretionary or mandatory access controls.
c. Determining Prioritiesfor EDI Security
A systematic approach should be utilized to determine appropriate EDI
environment security measures. EDI security should not be addressed by one individual or
a single organization. It is important to know the concerns and the needs of all of the
organizations which are involving in the business of using EDI. The following steps
provide a significant approach for implementation of a secure EDI.
(1) Define EDI Configurations. The first step in determining priorities for
EDI security is to define all aspects and assets of EDI. The goal of this step is twofold: the
first is to have a detailed EDI configuration that indicates interoperated hardware, the major
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EDI software applications used, significant information processed on the EDI system, and
how EDI documents flow through the platform; the second goal of this step is to evaluate
each part of the EDI system. Assets may include any piece of hardware, software,
application, data, etc. Assets then become areas of the EDI system that need to protected.
Configurations include: ' •
- EDI Software Packages. These include EDI software, EDI platform network
management software, EDI background database and its management systems, and some
EDI implementation project management systems, etc.
- EDI Platform Services. These include data transmission, the ability to link
E-mail, Fax and EDI, the ability of international communication, the ability of integration
and other platform related services.
- EDI System Environment Hardwares. These include the bar code system,
computers, networks, and other computer system related peripheral machines.
After the EDI configuration is completed, and the assets are determined and
valued, there should be a reasonably correct view of what the implementation of EDI
system consists of, and what areas of the EDI environment need protection.
(2) Determine Risk. The goal of determining the risk is to determine the level
of current security for the EDI system. To begin the process of determining the risk,
consider the threats to the EDI system and the possible vulnerabihties of the EDI system
that could be exploited by those threats. Risk analysis may uncover some vulnerabihties
that can be corrected by improving EDI management and operational controls. These
improved controls will usually reduce the risk of the threats by some degree until such time
that more thorough improvements may be planned and implemented. Attention should be
paid to existing EDI system security controls to determine if adequate protections being
provided to prevent vulnerabihties. These controls may be technical, procedural, etc. As
specific threats and related vulnerabihties are identified, a risk value needs to be associated
with the threat. The risk can be evaluated by some functions, such as probabilities of the
threats occurring and calculating the expected value of those threats.
Ill
To ensure that all identified risks and vulnerabilities are addressed, construct
a list by prioritizing the threats based on its risk. This list of potential threats, vulnerabilities
and related risks will allow an assessment of the current security situation for the EDI
system. Areas where there is adequate protection do not surface as contributing to the risk
of the EDI.
(3) Select Security Services and Security Mechanisms. This step examines
security services and mechanisms to reduce defined risks. Security services are the sum of
the mechanisms, procedures, that are implemented on the EDI system to provide
protection. This step is broken into four tasks.
- Task-1: Consider the security services provided in the EDI security
architecture.
- Task-2: After the needed security services are determined, consider the list
of security mechanisms for each service.
- Task-3: The decision to use a certain mechanism will largely depend on the
cost of the mechanism. The cost estimation of each mechanism should be made at this task.
- Task-4: Update the list of threats and mechanisms each time an examination
of the implementation of the EDI system occurs.
(4) Develop Priorities of EDI Security. The goal of this step is to produce a
prioritized list of security services and mechanisms that should be implemented to reduce
perceived EDI implementation risk and to protect the EDI system adequately. The process
involves the comparison of various threats and the influenced risk. Sometimes, an
evaluation model for threats should be built including the cost-effective factors to the
organization. After priorities have been set by the EDI implementing project team, the next
step is implemented.
(5) Implement and Test Security Mechanisms. Just as the mechanisms that
constitute the priorities for EDI system security were chosen using a systematic approach,
so should the implementation of those mechanisms proceed in the same manner. The goal
of this phase is to ensure that the security mechanisms are implemented correctly, are
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compatible with other EDI functionalities and security mechanisms, and that the security
mechanisms meet the requirements of providing adequate security. This step begins by
developing a plan to implement the mechanisms. This plan should consider factors such as
the timeliness required to reduce risk, available funding, etc. A testing schedule should
show how each mechanism interacts with other mechanisms. The expected results of the
interaction should be detailed. It should be recognized that not only it is important that the
mechanism perform functionally as expected and provide expected protections, but that the
mechanism does not contribute to the risk of the EDI system through a conflict with some
other mechanisms or functionalities. After all mechanisms are implemented, tested and
found acceptable, the list of priorities for EDI system security should be reexamined. All
these phases need to be repeated again until the end of the life cycle.
d. Construct Security Architecture.
Constructing the security architecture, requires the construction of a general
architecture of EDI, the subset security architecture, and identification of security
architecture issues.
(1) Construct the General EDI Architecture. From high-level perspectives, it
is possible to construct many different general models of EDI system.
- Mission architecture. Divide the primary mission into mission components,
then determine which centers and information processing centers support each component.
Then, determine which elements of the EDI system support the centers to accomplish their
missions. If the EDI system has a command and control structure, identify the flow of
mission command and control from the highest agencies to the lowest agencies
contributing to the EDI system.
- Communication-computer architecture. Identify EDI data flow from
individual sources, to processing entities such as correlation centers, to the EDI system
users.
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(2) Construct the Security Architecture. The security architecture must be
very detailed. It must identify general security facts, assess the EDI system's ability to meet
primary security objectives, and describe protection mechanisms used by the EDI system.
General security facts about the entire EDI system must be identified.
- Highest and lowest classifications processed, or types of sensitive
unclassified material being processed.
- Minimum and maximum user clearances and restrictions.
- All security modes of operation used through the EDI system. Second,
assess how the EDI system achieves these three security objectives:
- How does the EDI system protect secure data from unauthorized disclosure
(confidentiality)?
- How does the EDI system ensure system integrity (the abihty to function
unimpaired, free from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation) and data
integrity (i.e., does data correctly represents information, and do authorized users and EDI
system software processors handle and manipulate the data properly)?
- How does the EDI system provide assurance of service? Specifically
identify and describe mechanisms which protect against common threats and
vulnerabilities to the EDI system. Be sure to cover all the disciplines of physical security,
procedural security, personnel security, information security, communication security,
trusted system security, hardware and software security, integrity mechanisms, and other
security measures.
(3) Identify and document security architecture. Identify and document
security architectureissues uncovered during network investigation and analysis. Make
recommendations to resolve these issues.
e. Management Activities
Except for the cryptography technology, management activity is the most
important part of the security management model. The structure of security management
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programs may vary substantially from one organization to another. We need to examine all
the required security services and mechanisms that can help us solve the possible security
vulnerabilities and threats as described in Chapter IV. Five management activities that




- Associating authentication information, for example, passwords, keys,
identities, and tokens, to system entities.
- Updating, modifying and revoking authentication information.
- Assisting in the authentication verification process.
- Choosing the authentication mechanisms to be employed.
- Interaction with other security services, such as access control.
(2) Access Control Management.
- Establishing and associating access control information to system entities,
such as access control lists to files, roles and capabilities of users.
- Updating, modifying and revoking access control information and rules.
- Enforcing access control rules.
- Denying or granting access based on specific access control rules.
- Interaction with other security services.
(3) Key Management. Key management issues have been stated in Chapter III
and IV. The specific key management standard for EDI (ANSI XI 2.42) is based on ANSI
X9. 17. This standard contains a large number of options, many of which are not applicable
to an EDI environment. This management will be dependent on the type of encryption
mechanisms employed and the associated key distribution protocols. The activities involve
as following:
- Generation of suitable keys at intervals commensurate with the level of
security required.
- Determination in accordance with access control requirements of which
entities should receive a copy of each key.
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- Distribution of the keys in a secure manner.
- Decisions involving updating of keys, deletion or removal of keys and when
they become obsolete.
(4) Audit Management.
- The definition and selection of security relevant events to be logged and/or
collected.
- The enabling and disabling of audit trail logging of selected events.
- The analysis of audit trails.
- The preparation of security audit reports.
(5) Risk Management. [Ref. 46]
- Identify assets.
- Determine vulnerabilities.
- Estimate likelihood of exploitation.
- Compute expected annual cost
- Survey applicable controls and their costs.
- Project annual saving of control.
/. Management Considerations
Implementing this security management model may require managerial
considerations as follows [Ref. 47]:
(1) Separation of Control. This consideration is based on a concept that is
usually employed for a variety of reasons. From a practical point of view, it is helpful to
decompose any problem or activity into a set of independent tasks which can be assigned
to individuals that are trained to handle them. When automation is desired, separation of
control will apply to limit the responsibility of action to well defined areas so that easily
understood rules of action may be programmed into a machine to effect the desired results
in small increments. This process also provides multiple check points to evaluate each node
of the procedure, especially, in automation systems.
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Since this work addresses the problem of security in an EDI environment,
separation of control is valued most for its ability to isolate the responsibility for action.
Thus, it is possible to construct systems where errors can be quickly isolated to particular
individuals. To be most effective, it is essential that those working with the system
understand how easily errors can be attributed to their actions. In order to foster an
environment of cooperation, it must be communicated that their minor errors will not be
held against them. Separation of control is therefore necessary in a secure EDI system. The
responsible manager will design and implement EDI systems independently of any internal
application. A security officer is required who is not under the authority of anyone in
computer operations or programming, and the internal auditor must be familiar with the
entire of EDI system and its sequences.
(2) Internal Controls. The objectives of internal control are to protect the EDI
environment to assure that all transactions are properly processed. Generally, internal
controls include general, administration, and application controls. [Ref. 52] General and
administrative controls concern proper implementation, maintenance, and operating
procedures. These controls provide the standards and guidelines for a variety of
applications. Application controls are concerned about the accuracy of data, validity of
data, appropriate maintenance, and that process results fulfill demands of management.
Simply speaking, the application controls are data-oriented and specific task-oriented, and
general controls are procedure-oriented. The structure of internal controls is very
influential to the process of auditing.
(3) Auditing. Auditing serves an organization's security by making the
detection of security lapses more likely. The probability of detection should encourage an
organizations' employees to enforce security procedures. While a certain familiarity with
the technology is important, normal auditing concerns remain the same. Control problems
are likely to surface from a lack of a systematic flow of work, poorly written procedures,
untraine'd staff, no penalty for noncompliance with organizational policies, and lack of
testing and quality assurance.
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(4) Access Control. It is important tiiat responsibility for security at any given
time and place be assigned to one particular security officer who is responsible for all
employee access at the transmission site. The National Computer Security Center (NCSC)
has been established in the NSA to evaluate the quality of trust of specific commercial
operating systems.
(5) Records Retention. For the threats of repudiation, it is essential to
maintain the security of the signatures and the data received as long as there is any threat
of repudiation by the receiver. For any security environment, it is important to maintain
business records so long as questions can be raised concerning the procedures used. When
signatures expire, they should be achieved if they are used to provide confidentiality or
integrity for stored data (which means encryption or authentication are used). This is
especially important for encrypted stored data, for without the signature, the data will be
useless.
(6) Security Entities. Security entities are the processes that perform the
functions of encryption and authentication as defined in the ANSI X12 standards. It is
important that the physical and logical location of these entities be selected to satisfy the
user's business requirements. Since the security entities are responsible for all of the secret
information shared between trading partners, the security entities must be physically
secured from the threat of penetration by the outside agents. Logically, the security entities
must be placed in the processing chain so that the data is protected early enough to meet the
security needs, but not prior to the physical generation of all the data requiring protected.
In both views, it is important to create a security perimeter around the sensitive data internal
to any business partner so that it will be transparent that the current business systems need
protection. The security entity acts as a gateway to the protected interior of the perimeter
and the outside where the interchange will require the protection of the ANSI X12 security
standards.
(7) Interoperability. Interoperability is one of the success factors of EDI. It is
also a very important factor in security management. Two entities may successfully
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communicate only if their implementations are interoperable. They need to communicate
using protocols and procedures which are compatible with one another. Also, if the
encryption and decryption are schemes different, they will never work together. ANSI
XI 2.42 and ANSI XI 2.58 provide a number of options for the user to tailor the
cryptographic processes to a particular application. Security managers need to make
application decisions, and state the procedures in the agreement.
(S)Version Control. Version control is a part the of interoperabihty problem
which deals with two party support of the same version. It is important because the recovery
policy must be very specific when errors occur. Originally ANSI X12 specifications called
for support of the currently standardized version plus the most recent version. This may still
be adequate for the active EDI transaction database, but given the abilities of the current
database system, it hardly seems necessary to limit the capability of implementation. Each
version is only a set of tables and procedures that the computer is to follow. Perhaps
individual organizations should consider the possibiUty of supporting prior versions,
especially in those organizations where a wide ranging or loosely knit community will be
interchanging data.
(9) Security Network. Chapter 3 discussed techniques of cryptosystem for
securing the information. Two techniques may be provided for network security. One
technique to secure the network is end-to-end data encryption, which encodes information
and places it in an electronic "envelope". That envelope cannot be forced open until it
reaches its destination. In fact, end-to-end data encryption is sufficiently secure to be used
for electronic fund transfers and other highly sensitive electronic transactions. Another
encryption technique involves installing RSA's public key technology. However,
encryption doesn't completely prevent unauthorized users from entering parts of the system
where they don't belong. To prevent such trespassing, many security experts recommend
the use of a trusted server. How the trusted system implements such controls depends on
whether it uses the techniques of discretionary access control (DAC) or mandatory access
control (MAC). With DAC, individual data owners can decide who can share their
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information. The head of accounting, for example, could choose to let the customer service
chief see the files in the department's directory. MAC, on the other hand, lets network
administrators impose security controls on their own. It does this by allowing the
administrator to assign security levels for every user, and security levels for every
accessible file. Users can be assigned security rights based on such criteria as rank,
position, written agreement, and the results of background investigations. Files can be
assigned classifications such as top-secret, confidential, or public. Where both are in place,
MAC has precedence over DAC. This means that the same customer service chief might
be allowed to read only confidential or public data, but not files classified as top-secret.
Any time he attempts to read that top-secret accounting data, the trusted server will
automatically shut down and alert the network administrator of the attempt. Security of
network is essential to the EDI implementation.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Though EDI is not a new technology, it is becoming necessary for business
transactions. EDI applications can only automate some transactions, as a successful
company-wide implementation of EDI technology involves detailed planning. Good
business planning requires compatible and well-managed training and support. When
reviewing the EDI needs of a business, the EDI system manager must recommend the
protocols and software that are best suited to the corporate mission. An overview and
references of how to plan the implementation of EDI were discussed in Chapter EI.
Users are seeking support from vendors when combining EDI and MHS technologies
on a single network. Such a move offers users better security and tracking than is available
with existing EDI services. Large companies, interested in cutting costs of maintaining
separate networks for electronic business documents and electronic mail, also want a single
standards-based messaging network. The X.400 messaging protocol and its X.435 EDI
component may meet these demands. TTie use of OSI framework still requires the support
of translation software, transport services, and value-added network gateways. Without an
OSI operating environment, one may use the TCP/IP platform to run its EDI applications
and these products do exist.
The future of EDI lies in the direction of work group computing and the possible
large volume EDI processes. More reabstic costs would be exposed in an integration impact
assessment that analyzes expected payback, the number of trading partners, their level of
preparedness, and the need for integration switches to other applications.
Unfortunately, the security of EDI has not been solved, although it is a well known
issue. Chapter III surveyed digital signatures and in Chapter FV, we discussed security
threats and their solutions. Chapter V points out the weaknesses of EDI security. The ANSI
XI 2.58 EDI Cryptographic Security Structure Standard and XI 2.42 Cryptographic Service
Messages provide the most important security concepts, methods of encryption and
authentication for EDI systems. Security standards are associated with EDI standards.
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though they are not mandatory. All EDI standards recommending DES are known to have
difficulties in key management. Key management problems may be solved by DS, based
on public key cryptography.
Encrypting an entire document is a slow process when tight security is maintained.
If one uses RSA for signing a document by encrypting the message digest we will get
shorter processing time than if encrypting the entire EDI document. A compromise
between these two extremes is to use a private key system, such as DES, to encrypt the
document and then continue the digest signing by RSA. The best method will depend on
the requirements of the business transaction.
The provision of DS mechanisms does not guarantee a secure EDI system. In
addition, the security management of EDI may be addressed by building an EDI security
management model. The security management model presented in Chapter V sets security
goals, determines security policies and priorities, and constructs security architecture.
Management activities such as key management, access control management, audit
management, and risk management are also important considerations when implementing
the security of an EDI system.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
ANSI. American National Standard Institute.
ANSI ASC. Accredited Standards Committee of American National Standard Institute.
ASN.l. Abstract Syntax Notation One.
AU. Access unit.
BAUDOT. 5-Bit per character information coding scheme.
CA. Certification authority.
CCITT. The international telegraph and telephone consultative committee.
CBC. Cipher block chaining.
CFB-1. 1 -Bit cipher feedback.
CFB-8. 8-Bit cipher feedback.
CRL. Certificate revocation list.
CSM. Cryptographic service message.
DAC. Discretionary access control.
DAP. Directory access protocol.
DES. Data Encryption Standard.
DS. Digital signature.
DSA. Digital signature algorithm.
DSP. Directory system protocol.
DSS. Digital Signature Standard.
ECB. Electronic code book.
EDI. Electronic data interchange.
EDIFACT. Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce and Transfer.
EDIM. Electronic data interchange message.
EDIN. Electronic data interchange notifications.
EFT. Electronic funds transfer.
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FG. Function group.
FIPS. Federal information processing standard.
ISDN. Integrated services digital network.
ISO. International Standards Organization.
ITS. Initial text sequence.
IV. Initialization vector.
JIT. Just in time.
KD. Automatically distributed data key.
KDC. Key distribution center.
KK. Automatically distributed key encrypting key.
KKM. Manually distributed key encrypting key.
KMF. Key management facility.
KTC. Key translation center. ' > '
MD. Message digest.
MHS. Message handling system. ' '
MS. Message store.
MTA. Message transfer agent.
MTS. Message transfer system.
NCSC. National Computer Security Center.
NIST. National Institute of Standards and Technology.
NSA. National Security Agent.
OSI. Open system interconnection.
PEM. Privacy enhancement mail.
PKCS. Public Key Cryptography Standard.
POS. Point of sale.
QR. Quick response.
RF. Radio frequency.
RSA. An algorithm used for creating digital signatures invented by R. Rivest, A. Shamir,
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and L.Ademan and named after them.MIT professors
SHS. Secure Hash Standard.
SxE. ANSI X12 security trailer segment.
SxS. ANSI X12 security header segment.
SWIFT. Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication.
TCB. Trusted computing base.
TCP/IP. Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol.
TDCC. Transportation Data Coordinating Committee.




UCC. Uniform Commercial Code.
UCS. Uniform Code Standard.
UN/ECE. Economic Commission for Europe of United Nation.
VAN. Value added network.
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